Mississippi College Law Review
Volume 39
Issue 2 Vol. 39 Iss. 2

Article 6

2021

Reforming the Mississippi Criminal Code Part III: PersonEndangering Crimes Against Habitation and Property: Arson,
Burglary, Robbery, and Related Crimes
Judith J. Johnson
Mississippi College School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Johnson, Judith J. (2021) "Reforming the Mississippi Criminal Code Part III: Person-Endangering Crimes
Against Habitation and Property: Arson, Burglary, Robbery, and Related Crimes," Mississippi College Law
Review: Vol. 39 : Iss. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview/vol39/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact walter@mc.edu.

REFORMING THE MISSISSIPPI CRIMINAL CODE PART III: PERSONENDANGERING CRIMES AGAINST HABITATION AND PROPERTY:
ARSON, BURGLARY, ROBBERY AND RELATED CRIMES
Judith J. Johnson *
I. INTRODUCTION
This is the third in a series of articles advocating for change to the
Mississippi criminal laws, which is a vital part of criminal justice reform.
The first article explained why change is needed.1 Briefly, our criminal
laws have been justifiably criticized2 because of gross sentencing
disparities,3 vague definitions of the conduct prohibited,4 as well as
confusing or absent definitions of states of mind required to commit the
crime. The criminal statutes are also often disorganized and do not relate
to each other.5
I have chaired the committee to reform the penal code for more than
twenty years.6 We were originally appointed by the Mississippi Judicial
Advisory Study Committee, which was established in 1993 by the
legislature to improve the administration of justice.7 Our reform committee
was officially entitled the Criminal Code Consulting Group [hereinafter
referred to as the Committee] and was charged with suggesting revisions to
the penal code. We have been meeting since 1996, and we are finally
reaching the end of our charge. We hope to present our proposals to the
* Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. I want to thank all
my research assistants who have provided valuable support over the years, especially my
current research assistant Benjiman Blakely. I also want to thank the Committee and
Elizabeth Jones for editing assistance.
1. Judith J. Johnson, Why Mississippi Should Reform Its Penal Code, 37
MISS. C. L. REV. 107 (2019).
2. Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill, and Usman Mohammed, The Five
Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 1, 3 n.3
(2000) ranked the Mississippi Criminal Code as being the fifty-second worst criminal
code in the U.S. The study included the federal code and the D.C. code in their
assessments. Id.
3. See Johnson, supra note 1, at discussion accompanying notes 89-92.
4. See id. at discussion accompanying notes 67-72.
5. See id. at discussion accompanying notes 72-76.
6. See id. at 109.
7. MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-21-1 (1993 Cumulative Supplement). The Judicial
Advisory Study Committee was eliminated in 2018. H.B. 949 (2018). Our committee is
now operating under the auspices of the Mississippi Supreme Court.
237

238

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 39:2

legislature in the foreseeable future. The Committee is recommending a
comprehensive change to the laws to alleviate some of the problems with
the current code, described above and more comprehensively in my first
article.8 The Committee proposals are an important part of criminal justice
reform, and the purpose of these articles is to explain the Committee’s
reasoning, as well as to present the proposed changes to the law. These
articles are intended to replace comments, which the Committee did not
write, although there are extensive comments to the Model Penal Code on
which these proposals are based.
The first article introduced and explained the Committee’s process.9
In addition the first article explained two important substantive areas of
change, that is, states of mind and criminal homicide.10 The second article
addressed the most serious crimes against the person, other than criminal
homicide, and explained the Committee’s recommendations regarding
assault and battery and related crimes, kidnapping and related crimes, and
sex crimes.11 This article will cover crimes against habitation and property
that involve danger to persons—arson, burglary, and robbery. Future
articles will address other major groups of crimes.
As will become clear in this article, these three crimes have been
expanded by statutes, so that their original purpose of protecting persons
from danger has degenerated into mostly protecting property.
Unfortunately, the serious penalties attached to the original offenses often
still apply,12 and all three of these crimes may form the basis for a felonymurder charge, if a killing occurs in the commission of the crime.13 The
Committee accepted the Model Penal Code’s guidance in returning these
crimes to their purpose and grading less serious related offenses
proportionally.14
Section II of this article will briefly review the methodology of the
Committee’s work; Section III will explain the proposed changes to arson
and related offenses; Section IV will explain the proposed changes to
robbery; Section V will explain the proposed changes to burglary and
related crimes; and Section VI will conclude. 15

8. See Johnson, supra note 1.
9. See id. at II.
10. See id. at V.
11. See Judith J. Johnson, Reforming Mississippi’s Non-homicide Crimes
Against the Person, 38 MISS. C. L. REV. 201 (2021).
12. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 4-5 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
13. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW, at 39 (2d. ed. 1969).
14. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 10 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
15. The appendix lists the Mississippi statutes that should be repealed by these
proposals.
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II. COMMITTEE METHODOLOGY AND THE MODEL PENAL CODE
As described more fully in the first article,16 the Committee has been
meeting since 1996 and consists of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
legislative drafters, and law professors.17 The Committee has reviewed the
most important parts of Title 97 of Mississippi Code of 1972, which
contains the principal criminal statutes, working to develop a more
comprehensive and coherent penal code.18
As explained in more detail in the first article,19 the Committee
meets monthly and uses the Mississippi Code, the Model Penal Code, as
well as the laws of other states,20 to propose changes to the Mississippi law
to reflect the needs of the state and to correct some of the deficiencies in
the current code.21
The Committee principally based the proposed revisions on the
Model Penal Code [hereinafter the Model Code], which is discussed more
fully in the first article. 22 The Model Code serves as a measure of
uniformity among the majority of state codes that have reformed their penal
codes, all based on the Model Code.23

16. See Johnson, supra note 1, at II.
17. Current committee members: Professor Judith J. Johnson, chair, Professor
Matthew Steffey, reporter, Judge Donna Barnes, Judge John Emfinger, Greta Harris,
Caryn Quilter, Professor Ronald J. Rychlak, Kathy Sones, Alison Steiner, Ed Snyder,
and Gwynetta Tatum. See Johnson, supra note 1, at n.10 for prior members.
18. The Committee has been meeting in Jackson at the Mississippi College
School of Law. The law school has furnished the meeting space and paid the research
assistant. In addition, the law school also furnished lunch for the committee for several
years under the leadership of Dean Jim Rosenblatt. We are very grateful for the support
of the law school during all these years. The Administrative Office of the Courts has
also furnished valuable support to the committee by sending out meeting notices and
providing lunch for the committee for several years.
19. See Johnson, supra note 1, at II.
20. See infra note 288 and discussion accompanying notes 287-90.
21. The references to the minutes throughout usually reflect the Committee’s
most recent review of the statute, although the Committee may have originally adopted
the statute much earlier.
22. See Johnson, supra note 1, at III.
23. Gerald E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The
Challenge of the Special Part, 2 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 297 (1998). In addition to
establishing some uniformity among criminal codes and crimes, virtually all-American
law students are introduced to the Model Code and its version of general definitions, as
well as many of its crimes and defenses. Id. Also, courts and commentators frequently
cite the Model Code as persuasive authority. Id. Finally, the drafters wrote extensive
comments, explaining the provisions of the Model Code in detail. Although the
comments will not be part of the legislation, lawyers, judges and courts often rely on the
comments to interpret the Model Code provisions. Id.
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The Model Code divides crimes by seriousness and punishes them
accordingly, delineating three degrees of felonies,24 which the Committee
expanded to four degrees.25 The Model Code recognizes misdemeanors but
does not divide them according to seriousness.26 The Committee disagreed
with this and divided misdemeanors into four classes, A-D.27 Finally the
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
25. Section 6.01. Minutes of the Consulting Grp. on Mississippi Criminal
Code Revision, (September 12, 2014) [hereinafter cited as Minutes] (on file with the
author). The minutes are unpublished but may be accessed by applying to the author.
The proposed sentencing scheme for felonies is as follows:
§ 6.06. Sentence of Imprisonment for Felony
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to
imprisonment, as follows:
(a) in the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term the minimum of which
shall be fixed by the Court at not less than twenty one year nor more than ten
years, and the maximum of which shall be life imprisonment;
(b) in the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term the minimum of
which shall be fixed by the Court at not less than ten one year nor more than
three years, and the maximum of which shall be ten twenty years;
(c) in the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term the minimum of which
shall be fixed by the Court at not less than one year, nor more than two years,
and the maximum of which shall be five ten years;
(d) in the case of a felony of the fourth degree, for a term the minimum of which
shall be fixed by the Court, and the maximum of which shall be five years.
Thus, murder is a felony in the first degree, MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(2)
(AM. LAW INST. 1985), along with aggravated forms of rape, id. at § 213.1(1); robbery,
id. at § 222.1(2), .and kidnapping, id. at § 212.1. Manslaughter is a felony in the second
degree, id at § 210.3(2), along with non-aggravated forms of rape, id. at § 210 (2);
robbery, id. at § 222.1(2); kidnapping, id. at § 213.1(1). Negligent homicide is a felony
in the third degree, id. at § 210.4, along with non-aggravated burglary, and crimes of
similar seriousness. id. at § 221.1(2). The more serious theft crimes were classified as
felonies in the fourth degree, Minutes, supra note 25 (September, 2012), along with
others. See, e.g., less serious forms of Criminal Mischief, Minutes, supra note 25 (July,
2020) and Obstruction, Minutes, supra note 25 (August 2019); as well as crimes such as
Criminal Trespass, Minutes, supra note 25 (September 2018); Public Drunkenness
Minutes, supra note 25 (March, 2012); and Disorderly Conduct, Minutes, supra note 25
(March, 2012).
26. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.08 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
27. See Minutes, supra note 25 (March, 2012; September, 2014). The
sentencing scheme for misdemeanors and violations is as follows:
§ 6.08
(a) Sentences of misdemeanors shall be a definite term of imprisonment in the
county jail or to hard labor for the county, within the following limitations:
(1) For a Class A misdemeanor, not more than one year.
(2) For a Class B misdemeanor, not more than six months.
(3) For a Class C misdemeanor, not more than three months.
(4) For a Class D misdemeanor, not more than one month.
(b) A violation is punished by a fine of not more than $200 $250.
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Model Code classifies regulatory offenses as violations,28 which are not
considered true crimes and thus not criminal.29 The Committee adopted the
violation category.30
As noted, the first article discussed mens rea and the most serious
crimes against the person, the homicide crimes.31 The second article
focused on non-homicide crimes against the person.32 This article will
discuss other crimes that may endanger persons—arson, robbery, and
burglary and related offenses.33 We will begin with arson and related
crimes, which we adopted from the Model Code.
III. ARSON AND RELATED OFFENSES
In article 220, the Model Code recognizes three crimes that relate to
destruction of property.34 The severity of the punishment depends on
whether the property destruction also endangers persons.35 Arson36 and
“causing or risking a catastrophe”37 are considered person-endangering.38
28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
29. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 113.
30. See Minutes, supra note 25 (August 14, 2014).
31. See Johnson, supra note 1, at V.
32. See Johnson, supra note 11.
33. I want to explain how I dealt with statutes in this article. If the statute is
relatively short, I put it in the text. If the statute is discussed fully in the text, but is too
long to put in the text, I put the statute in the footnotes to avoid distracting the reader.
Statutes that are long and not necessary to understanding the text were added to the
appendix.
We used basically the same numbers as the Model Code, even if we did not
base the statute on the Model Code. It is necessary, ultimately, to retain the Model Code
numbering system because, as with other model acts, there are numerous internal crossreferences. I am distinguishing the sections that were not based on the Model Code by
designating those with section numbers only. If I am referring to the original version of
the Model Code, I cited it, using the official citation form for the Model Code. If we
made changes to the original version, I added to the Model Code designation the
following: “as adopted by the Committee” and added the reference to the minutes of the
meeting where we adopted the changes. If we made minimal changes to the Model
Code, I indicated changes to Model Code with underlining and underlined strikeouts. If
we used the Mississippi statute as the basis for the proposed statute, Iindicated changes
from the Mississippi statute in the same manner. I also drew extensively on the Model
Code comments, since these comments are very helpful in understanding the rationale of
the proposed statutes, especially when we did not make many changes to the Model Code
version.
34. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
35. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
36. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
37. Id. at § 220.2.
38. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 1-2 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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On the other hand, criminal mischief,39 the third crime in this article, is not
considered person-endangering and may be punished as a much less serious
offense against property.40
A. Arson
Arson at common law was considered a serious felony because it
posed a danger to people. The crime was essentially the malicious burning
of the dwelling of another,41 so it was considered a crime against habitation,
along with burglary.42 Throughout the United States, statutory changes to
arson transformed the offense into a property crime, often applying the
offense to the burning of any property. The offense, however, remained a
serious felony, so that burning a crate of vegetables could be treated as
seriously as burning a church.43 The Model Code sought to treat arson as it
was treated under the common law, re-establishing that danger to persons
should be the rationale for the most aggravated form of arson. Arson,
however, always presents a danger to firefighters, so the type of property
burned must also be considered.44 If a person were actually harmed, other
offenses such as aggravated assault45 or criminal homicide could be charged
in addition to arson.46
The Committee adopted the following version of arson with
underlining to indicate additions and strike-outs to indicate deletions from
the original Model Code:
Section 220.1 Arson and Related offenses
(1) Arson. A person is guilty of arson, as a felony in the second
degree, if he starts a fire or causes an explosion with the purpose
of (a) destroying a building or an occupied structure of another.
b) destroying or damaging any property, whether his own or
another’s, to collect insurance for such loss, if the actor’s
conduct recklessly endangers any building or occupied structure
of another or places any other person in danger of death or
bodily injury.

39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
40. Id. at § 220.3. There are other less serious offenses punishing property
destruction. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.9 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (Desecration
of Venerated Objects).
41. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
42. See PERKINS, supra note 13, at 192.
43. See id. at 5.
44. See id. at 10.
45. See Johnson, supra note 1, at III.2 for an explanation of aggravated assault.
46. See Johnson, supra note 1 V. B. for an explanation of homicide crimes.
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(2) Reckless Burning or Exploding. A person commits a felony in
the third degree is guilty of arson, as a felony in the third degree, if
he purposely starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own
property or another’s and thereby recklessly:
a) places another person in danger of death or bodily injury;
or
with the purpose of destroying or damaging any property,
whether his own or another’s, to collect insurance for such a
loss; or
b) thereby recklessly places another person in danger of
death or serious bodily injury; or
c) thereby recklessly places an building or occupied
structure of another in danger of damage or destruction.
(3) Failure to Control or Report Dangerous Fire. A person who
knows that a fire is endangering life or a substantial amount of
property of another and fails to take reasonable measures to put out
or control the fire, when he can do so without substantial risk to
himself, or to give a prompt fire alarm, commits a misdemeanor if:
(a) he knows that he is under an official, contractual, or other legal
duty to prevent or combat the fire; or
(b) the fire was started, albeit lawfully, by him or with his assent, or
on property in his custody or control.
(4) Definitions. “Occupied structure” means any structure, vehicle
or place adapted for overnight accommodation of persons, or for
carrying on business therein, whether or not a person is actually
present. Property is that of another, for the purposes of this section,
if anyone other than the actor has a possessory or proprietary
interest therein. If a building or structure is divided into separately
occupied units, any unit not occupied by the actor is an occupied
structure of another.
The conduct prohibited by the Model Code is starting a fire or
causing an explosion.47 Because attempt under the Model Code is punished
as severely as the crime intended in most cases, there is no need to add
attempt to the statute, as some states have done.48 There is also no
47. MODEL PENAL CODE 220.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
48. At early common law, attempt to commit any crime was a misdemeanor.
See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 213 n. 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). This idea of
punishing all attempts as misdemeanors was carried over into American jurisdictions, in
which attempt was often not punished with significant severity. See generally WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW§ 11.2(a) (5th ed. 2010). For example, at one time, a defendant
could get the death penalty for rape but could be charged only with a misdemeanor for an
attempted rape. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 304 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). In
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requirement that the fire or explosion cause any damage. The only
requirement is that the actor started the fire or caused the explosion with
the requisite state of mind.49
There are two subsections. The first is a felony in the second
degree;50 the second is a felony in the third degree.51 Under subsection (1),
to be guilty of a felony in the second degree, the actor must be engaging in
starting the fire or causing the explosion with the purpose of destroying an
occupied structure of another. If the fire or explosion is not intended to
destroy this type of structure, the Committee thought that the offense should
not be punished as the second degree felony of arson.52 In other words, if
the purpose is just to damage an occupied structure, not to destroy it, the
offense would not be punishable under this subsection.53 Similarly if the
structure was not an occupied structure, as defined in section 220.0(1),54 the
Committee did not think this subsection should apply.55 Subsection (2) or
the crime of criminal mischief may apply to these situations, as discussed
below.56
The Committee did not agree with the Model Code’s application of
the offense to “a building”57 and confined liability under this subsection to

addition, attempt required the defendant to come very close to commission of the target
offense. Id. at 184. The Model Code’s version of attempt, which the Committee adopted,
Minutes, supra note 25 (October, November 1996), corrects both problems, punishing
attempt as severely as the crime intended in most cases and requiring only a substantial
step that strongly corroborates the defendant’s intent, rather than requiring the defendant
to be close to success. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). In the case of
arson, as a felony in the second or third degree, depending on the circumstances, attempt
to commit arson would also be punished as a felony in the second or third degree. See
MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 15 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
49. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 16 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
51. Id. at § 220.1(2).
52. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL
PENAL CODE § 220.1, as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July,
2020).
53. Id. Under the original version of Section 220.1, damaging property to
collect the insurance was punishable as a second degree felony, but the Committee
moved this to subsection (2). Id.
54. See infra note 59.
55. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL
PENAL CODE §220.1, as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July, 2020).
56. See infra note 120 and discussion accompanying notes 124-25.
57. There was no definition of “building” in arson. In the comments, the
drafters said that the idea of a building indicates it is suitable for occupancy, and if not
the defense that it is abandoned is available. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 18
(AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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an “occupied structure of another.”58 The Committee adopted definitions
that apply to this article in section 221.0, incorporating the definitions from
former subsection 221.1(4), which the Committee deleted.59 In section
221.0(1), “occupied structure” is defined as:
any structure, vehicle, or place adapted for overnight
accommodation of persons, or for carrying on business
therein, whether or not a person is actually present. If a
building or structure is divided into separately occupied
units, any unit not occupied by the actor is an occupied
structure of another.60
This clarifies that the most serious form of arson is directed at protecting
people from danger, even though the definition of “occupied structure”
does not require that a person actually be present. Even without a person
present, because the structure is capable of having persons present, the same
danger may be contemplated. Also, it is more likely that firefighters will
be engaged in more dangerous efforts to ensure that there are no persons
present and to put out the conflagration in such a structure.61
58. MODEL PENAL CODE §220.1, as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July, 2020).
59. Id. Section 220.0 Arson, Criminal Mischief, and Other Property
Destruction
The following definitions apply to this Article:
(1) “occupied structure” means any structure, vehicle, or place adapted
for overnight accommodation of persons, or for carrying on business therein,
whether or not a person is actually present. If a building or structure is divided
into separately occupied units, any unit not occupied by the actor is an occupied
structure of another.
(2) Property or structure of another, for the purposes of this article, will
include anyone other than the actor who has a possessory or proprietary interest
therein.
(3) “Property,” for purposes of this article, is property that is capable of
being touched or , as distinguished from intangible property, which has intrinsic
or marketable value, not just but is merely the representative or evidence of
value.
(4) Catastrophe means serious physical injury to ten (10) or more
people or substantial damage to five (5) or more occupied structures.
(5) In this Article, the definitions given in Section 210.0 apply unless a
different meaning plainly is required.
MODEL PENAL CODE §220.0(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985), as adopted by the
Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
60. Id. at §220.0(1).
61. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 220 cmt. at 19 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). The definition is now contained in the separate
definition section proposed by the Committee. See supra note 59.
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Under the common law, the actor could not be guilty of burning his
own property.62 The Model Code also imposes this limitation with
modifications, which the Committee expanded upon. Property of another,
however, includes “anyone other than the actor who has a possessory or
proprietary interest therein.”63 Thus, if the actor is the owner but intends to
burn a structure leased to a tenant, he should be liable under this subsection.
Similarly, if the actor is the lawful tenant, but not the owner, he would be
liable.64 The actor’s liability for damaging his own property by fire or
explosion is addressed by other provisions, in this or other statutes, such as
intending to defraud the insurer65 or intending to kill occupants or acting
with reckless indifference to the lives of occupants.66
However, under section (1), the purpose must be to destroy the
“occupied structure,” not just the property of another.67 The Committee
was concerned that this would exclude from coverage the actor who burns
his own occupied structure to spite one who has an interest in the home.68
The original Model Code description of “property of another” in Section
220.0(2) did not include “structure,” so if the actor burned his own home to
disadvantage his soon-to-be divorced-wife, he would not be guilty of arson
under section 220.1(1).69 To avoid this result, the Committee added
“structure of another” to this description,” so that burning of ones’ own
occupied structure would be the first degree felony of arson, if another
person had an interest in the structure.70 This change would also apply to
section 220.1(2), if the actor recklessly endangered an occupied structure
of another.71
In addition, by operation of part of the definition of occupied
structure, section 220.1(1)72 provides for liability for intending to destroy
62. Id.
63. Id. at § 220.0(3). This definition was taken from deleted subsection (4).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 (4) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). See supra note 59 and
discussion accompanying notes 59 and 98.
64. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 22 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
65. MODEL PENAL CODE §220.1(2) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
66. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 23 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
67. MODEL PENAL CODE §220.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
68. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
69. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
70. Id. at §220.0(3). This definition was taken from deleted subsection (4).
MODEL PENAL CODE §220.1 (4) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). See supra note 59 and
discussion accompanying notes 59 and 98.
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(2) as adopted by the Committee. See
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 2020).
72. This definition was also adapted from subsection (4), which the Committee
deleted. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).

2021] REFORMING THE MISSISSIPPI CRIMINAL CODE PART III

247

separately occupied portions of the structure, not occupied by the arsonist.73
This is to be sure, first, that arson applies only to the structure of another,
as discussed above,74 and also that if the actor intended to burn a separate
apartment or hotel room, for example, section 220.1(1) could apply.75 The
subsection was not designed, however, to allow multiple counts of arson if
an apartment building with separate units is burned or intended to be
burned. Each unit would not be a separate count, so that intending to burn
the entire structure or multiple units would be a single count of arson.76
The original Model Code version of the second degree felony of
arson added the purpose of collecting insurance for the loss, if persons or
occupied structures were endangered.77 The Committee decided to punish
this conduct under subsection (2) as a felony in the third degree, as
discussed below.78
Thus, subsection (2), among other things, requires the actor to
purposely start a fire or cause an explosion, on his own property or that of
another.79 In addition, he must have the purpose of collecting insurance, or

73. MODEL PENAL CODE §220.0(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1985), as added by the
Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
74. See supra note 63 and discussion accompanying notes 63-71.
75. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(1) as added by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 2020).
76. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 22 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
78. See infra note 79 and discussion accompanying notes 87-89.
79. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985), as adopted by the
Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
The Committee adopted the Model Code’s definition of “purposely”:
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof,
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause
such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of
the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they
exist.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Minutes, supra note
25 (March, 2018). See Johnson, supra note 1, at V.A. for an explanation of section 2.02.
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he must recklessly80 endanger another person or an occupied structure of
another.81
We added arson to defraud insurers to subsection (2)(a) so that
purposely starting a fire or causing an explosion to collect insurance,
whether it is the actor’s property or property of another, is a third degree
felony, rather than a second degree felony, which was in the original version
of the Model Code.82 This conduct would otherwise be theft by deception,83
which is punished as a fourth degree felony, as adopted by the Committee,
depending on the value of the property.84
The Committee wanted to limit the second degree felony of arson
in subsection (1) to intentional conduct that endangered persons.85
Subsection (2) is not so limited. It applies to any property, not just occupied
structures addressed in subsection (1). The subsection also applies whether
it is the actor’s property or that of another.86
The original version of the Model Code limited the liability for
insurance fraud under Section 220.1 to situations that recklessly endanger
persons or occupied structures.87 The Committee moved that subsection to
subsection 2(a) and did not limit it to a particular type of property. Thus,
the subsection would apply to burning merchandise to collect insurance, for

80. The Committee adopted the Model Code’s definition of “recklessly” in
Section 2.02:
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and
the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Minutes supra note
25 (March, 2018). See Johnson supra note 1, at V.A. for an explanation of section 2.02.
81. Id.
82. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(1) & (2) as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
83. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(h) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes
supra note 25 (January 14, 2000).
84. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 223.3 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes
supra note 25 (March 8, 2000).
85. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(2). Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
87. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985)
(original version) with MODEL PENAL CODE §220.1(2)(a) as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
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example.88 Subsection (2) is also not limited to intent to destroy the
property, but includes the purpose to damage the property, whether the
actor’s own or another’s with the purpose of collecting insurance for the
loss.89
The last two subsections of subsection (2) revert to the original
purpose of arson and, that is, to prevent danger to persons.90 Subsection
2(b) requires that the actor, in addition to having the purpose of starting a
fire or causing an explosion, recklessly place another in danger of death or
bodily injury.91 The Committee decided to require that the bodily injury
must be “serious” bodily injury.92
To be guilty of arson under subsection 2(c), in addition to the
prohibited purpose, the actor must recklessly place an occupied structure of
another in danger of damage or destruction.93 This is as opposed to the
requirement of subsection (1) that the actor act with the purpose of
destroying the occupied structure of another.94

88. MODEL PENAL CODE §220.1(2)(a) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
89. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(2)(a) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
90. See supra discussion accompanying notes 41-46.
91. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1)(b) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
The Committee incorporated the definitions in section 210.0 into this article, as
well as articles 220 and 221. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(5) as adopted by the
Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
§ 210.0. Definitions.
In Articles 210-213, unless a different meaning plainly is required:
(1) “human being” means a person who has been born and is alive;
(2) “bodily injury” means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical
condition;
(3) “serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of
death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ;
(4) “deadly weapon” means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument,
material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is
used or is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or
serious bodily injury.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra
note 25 (April, 2018).
93. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1)(c) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
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The Model Code included two other subsections, which the
Committee decided not to adopt.95 We decided that failure to report or
control a fire should not be criminalized, absent other elements.96 Similarly,
the Committee did not generally believe that failure to report should be
criminalized, following the Anglo-American tradition of not penalizing
omissions.97 Therefore, the Committee is not recommending the adoption
of subsection (3). In addition, as noted earlier, the Committee deleted the
definition section (4) and incorporated it into a separate definition section,
which applies to all of the statutes in this article, including the next section,
“causing a catastrophe.”98
B. Causing A Catastrophe.
The Committee adopted some of the Model Code’s version of “causing or
risking a catastrophe;”99 however, we simplified, renamed and substantially
reorganized it.100 We retained some of the same ideas, especially with
regard to “causing a catastrophe”; however, we do not propose to impose
liability for “risking a catastrophe” in this section or for failure to prevent a
catastrophe. This is the version of Section 220.2 that the Committee
adopted:
95. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(3) & (4) as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(3). Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
97. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 33 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
98. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (original
version) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(2) & (3) as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
99. § 220.2. Causing or Risking Catastrophe.
(1) Causing Catastrophe. A person who causes a catastrophe by explosion, fire,
flood, avalanche, collapse of building, release of poison gas, radioactive
material or other harmful or destructive force or substance, or by any other
means of causing potentially widespread injury or damage, commits a felony of
the second degree if he does so purposely or knowingly, or a felony of the third
degree if he does so recklessly.
(2) Risking Catastrophe. A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he recklessly
creates a risk of catastrophe in the employment of fire, explosives or other
dangerous means listed in Subsection (1).
(3) Failure to Prevent Catastrophe. A person who knowingly or recklessly fails
to take reasonable measures to prevent or mitigate a catastrophe commits a
misdemeanor if:
(a) he knows that he is under an official, contractual or other legal duty
to take such measures; or
(b) he did or assented to the act causing or threatening the catastrophe.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
100. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
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Section 220.2 Causing a Catastrophe
A person who causes a catastrophe by
(a) explosion;
(b) fire;
(c) flood;
(d) avalanche;
(e) collapse of building;
(f) poison gas;
(g) radioactive material; or
(h) any other means causing potentially widespread injury
or damage
commits a felony of the second degree if he does so purposely or
knowingly, or a felony of the third degree if he does so recklessly.101
“Causing a catastrophe” is a crime that was unknown at common
law, but it comports with the idea that underlies the crime of arson,
punishing contemplated property destruction that presents a danger to
persons.102 In the case of section 220.2, the actual widespread property
destruction contemplated here would be dangerous to life.103 If actual harm
to persons occurs, other criminal provisions would also apply.104
The Model Code chose not to define the word “catastrophe,” so the
Committee adopted the following definition in section 220.0(4), which was
cited in the Model Code comments and used by other states:105
(4) Catastrophe means serious physical injury to ten (10) or more
people or substantial damage to five (5) or more occupied
structures.106
The methods of causing a catastrophe are listed and given an alphabetical
designation in our version, as opposed to the Model Code, which provided
a narrative listing of the methods without enumerating them.107 The
101. Id.
102. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 35-36 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
103. See id.
104. For example, if a person were killed, this could be murder under section
210.1 for acting recklessly with extreme indifference to the value of human life. MODEL
PENAL CODE §210.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
105. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 37 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
106. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(4) as added by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
107. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL
PENAL CODE § 220.2 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10,
2020).
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original Model Code version of section 220.2(1) appeared wordy and too
complex, so the Committee chose to list the methods. However, the
methods listed by the Committee and those specified in section 220.2 of the
Model Code are the same.108
Consistent with the mens rea for arson, if the actor causes the
catastrophe purposely or knowingly,109 he is guilty of a second degree
felony.110 If he is does so recklessly, he is guilty of a third degree felony.111
The punishments are consistent with the Model Code in this regard.112
The Committee did not adopt the remainder of the Model Code
section. Section 220.2(2) would punish as a misdemeanor “risking a
catastrophe.”113 The Committee thought that this would be difficult to
apply when the catastrophe did not occur.114 If the actor was intending to
cause a catastrophe and took a substantial steps toward that end, he would
be guilty of attempt.115 Otherwise the Committee did not believe that
“risking a catastrophe” could be fairly applied.116
The last subsection, subsection (3), of the original version of the
Model Code would punish failure to prevent a catastrophe.117 As with the
rejected “duty to report” in Section 220.1,118 the Committee did not believe
that creating a new duty to prevent a catastrophe, which would include one

108. Id.
109. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE §220.2 as adopted by
the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
110. The Committee adopted the Model Code’s § 2.02 definition of knowingly
as follows:
(b) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to a
material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that
nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware
that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a
result.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Minutes, supra note 25
(Dec. 2006). See Johnson, supra note 1, at V. A. for a discussion of section 2.02.
111. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
112. See supra note 52.
113. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
114. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
115. See supra note 48 and accompanying discussion.
116. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
118. See supra note 96 and discussion accompanying notes 97-98.
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not of the actor’s making, was a beneficial addition to the criminal law.119
Other than failure to report and failure to prevent a catastrophe, some of the
other ideas rejected by the Committee in Sections 220.1 and .2 are covered
by criminal mischief, which will be considered next.
C. Criminal Mischief
Criminal mischief is the last crime in this article of the Model Code.
The Committee adopted almost all of the Model Code version of this crime,
except for the stricken and underlined portions,120 as follows:
Section 220.3 Criminal Mischief.
(1) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of criminal mischief if he:
(a) damages property of another purposely, recklessly, or by
criminal negligence in the employment of fire, explosives, or other
dangerous means listed in Section 220.2(1); or
(b) purposely or recklessly tampers with tangible property of
another so as to endanger person or property.
(c) purposely or recklessly causes another to suffer pecuniary loss
by deception or threat
(2) Grading. Criminal mischief is a felony in the third degree if the
actor purposely causes pecuniary loss in excess of $5000, or a
substantial interruption or impairment of public communication,
transportation, supply of water, gas or power, or other public
service. It is a Class A misdemeanor if the actor purposely or
recklessly causes pecuniary loss in excess of $100. , or a petty
misdemeanor if he purposely or recklessly causes pecuniary loss in
excess of $25 The pecuniary losses caused by the same actor may
be aggregated. Otherwise criminal mischief is a violation Class D
misdemeanor.121
Criminal mischief is derived from the common law misdemeanor of
malicious mischief, which required maliciously damaging tangible
property of another.122 As opposed to the other two crimes in this article,
119. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
120. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL
PENAL CODE § 220.3 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10,
2020).
121. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
122. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 220 cmt. at 41 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). The
Model Code did not use the term malicious, as discussed in my first article, preferring to
use more exact terms for mens rea. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 116.
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criminal mischief is mostly a property crime, not primarily contemplating
injury to persons.123
Criminal mischief takes up where “causing a catastrophe” and arson
stop because the offense requires damage only to property, not widespread
property destruction or intent to start a fire or cause an explosion that could
endanger persons.124 Criminal mischief under section 220.3 is a catchall
offense that supplements several other types of interference with property
not covered by theft, forgery or fraud, as well as arson.125
There are three parts, (a), (b) and (c), under the original Model Code
section 220.3(1), but the Committee is only recommending parts (a) and
(b).126 Both of these parts recommended by the Committee apply to
“tangible property.” The Model Code did not define property in this
section, so the Committee added the following definition in section
220.0(3):
Property, for purposes of this article, is property that is capable of
being touched or which has intrinsic or marketable value, as
distinguished from intangible property, which has no intrinsic and
marketable value not just merely the representative or evidence of
value.127
This definition distinguishes the property capable of damage under section
220.3 from intangible interests in property, such as contract rights. Property
under this article is thus not as broadly defined as property is defined under
the theft article, which is “anything of value.”128 Thus, criminal mischief,
as conceived by the Committee, is limited to damage to physical property,
leaving damage to other property interests to the civil law or to other articles
of the Model Code.129

123. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 40 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
124. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(1) & (2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985)
with MODEL PENAL CODE §220.0(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
125. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 42 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
126. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(3) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). Although subsection 220.3(1)(a) does not use the term
“tangible” property, that is what is clearly intended because only tangible property could
be damaged by fire or explosion. See supra note 59.
127. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(3) as added by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
128. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 43 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
129. See id. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
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In addition, the offense, as proposed by the Committee, applies only
to property of another, as discussed above with regard to arson.130 Property
of another is property that another has title to, or possession of, other than
the actor.131 Therefore, the actor may be guilty of criminal mischief for
damaging property of another, even if he has title to the property but another
has possession, or if he has possession and another has title.132
Subsection (1)(a) requires that the actor damage property by “fire,
explosives, or other dangerous means listed in section 220.2.”133 As
opposed to arson, which requires only that the actor start a fire or cause an
explosion to purposely destroy an occupied structure, subsection (1)(a)
requires that the actor actually damage property of another purposely,
recklessly or by criminal negligence.134
The drafters of the Model Code generally did not believe that
criminal negligence135 should be sufficient to be criminal, except in very
limited situations.136 This was one of those limited situations. If the actor
is employing a dangerous means and falls substantially below a reasonable
person standard, he should be liable for damaging property of another.137
However, the drafters thought that the actor should be guilty of only a
violation, if he is merely criminally negligent.138 As discussed further

130. See supra note 61 and discussion accompanying notes 61-79. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
131. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(2) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
132. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL
PENAL CODE §220.3(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
133. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
134. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE §220.3(1) as adopted
by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
135. The Committee adopted the Model Code’s definition of “negligently”
renaming it “criminally negligently.”:
(d) Criminally Negligently.
A person acts criminally negligently with respect to a material element of an
offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such
a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature
and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Minutes, supra note 25
(July 10, 2020). See Johnson supra note 1, at V. A. for a discussion of § 2.02.
136. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 47 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
137. See id. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 118-19 for a discussion of criminal
negligence.
138. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
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below, the Committee changed this punishment to a Class D
misdemeanor.139
Subsection (1)(a) applies only to the actor who damages the
property of another, which means that there must be some physical harm to
the property.140 If the actor intends to harm the property, but has not done
so, he could be guilty of attempt or of tampering under subsection (1)(b).141
Under subsection (1)(b), the actor is liable if he endangers a person
or property by purposely or recklessly tampering with the property of
another.142 Tampering would include such actions as disabling a fire alarm
so that persons or property would be endangered. Actual harm would not
have to occur under this subsection.143
The third type of criminal mischief recognized by the Model Code
in subsection (1)(c) applies to an actor who causes pecuniary loss by
deception or threat.144 Along with most other states, the Committee did not
think that subsection (1)(c) belonged in this article.145 The subsection was
intended to cover conduct not previously criminalized, such as practical
jokes carried too far.146 The Committee thought that the conduct prohibited
could be applied too broadly and could be difficult to distinguish from
legitimate business transactions. In addition, we believed that the conduct
was sufficiently dealt with in other articles that are more related to threats
or deception causing loss.147
Although criminal mischief is primarily a property crime, the
penalty may be severe, depending on the actor’s state of mind and the type
of damage. If the property damage is caused purposely and the pecuniary
loss is in excess of $5000 or causes a substantial disruption to public
services, such as communication, transportation, water, gas or power
supply, the offense is a third degree felony.148

139. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). See infra note 151
and discussion accompanying notes 151-53.
140. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 47 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
141. See id.
142. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
143. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 49 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
144. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (original Model
Code version.)
145. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 50 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
146. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 10 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). The
example in the comments is sending a telegram giving false information that the
recipient’s mother is dying, so that he spends money to rush to her side.
147. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE
Article 224 Forgery and Fraudulent Practices (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
148. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
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The purposeful interruption of public services is obviously
deserving of a greater penalty. In addition, the Committee thought that
purposely causing pecuniary loss in excess of $5000 should be punished
more severely than theft of the same amount of property because of the
more serious conduct involved.149 If the actor is only reckless in the
employment of a dangerous means or tampers with property so as to
endanger persons or property, the Committee classified this as a class A
misdemeanor if the loss is more than $100.150
The Committee made other changes to the Model Code scheme at
this point. If the loss is less than $100, regardless of how much less, or if
the actor is criminally negligent under subsection (1)(a), criminal mischief
is a Class D misdemeanor,151 as opposed to a violation, as originally
envisioned by the Model Code.152 The Committee also specifically
provided for aggregation of pecuniary losses.153
The Committee decided to incorporate a part of the Mississippi
statute into this article, requiring the actor to pay for the cost of fire
suppression, as follows:
D. Paying for Cost for Fire Suppression
The Committee thought that requiring the actor to pay for the cost
of his crime was justified and a beneficial addition to the punishment. The
Committee is proposing the addition of the following section of a
Mississippi arson statute.154 The only change the Committee made was
with regard to whether the penalty is mandatory or discretionary. The
Committee thought the extra penalty should be discretionary, as follows:
Section 220.X Reimbursement to Fire Suppression Agency
In addition to the penalties provided in this section, upon conviction,
a person shall may be ordered to reimburse and pay in restitution
149. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §220.3(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with
MODEL PENAL CODE §223.1(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Theft is a fourth degree felony if
the amount exceeds $1000. MODEL PENAL CODE §223.1(3) as adopted by the
Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (March 8, 2019).
150. MODEL PENAL CODE §220.3(2) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
151. Id.
152. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with
MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(2) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25
(July 10, 2020).
153. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(2) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
154. MISS. CODE ANN. §97-17-13(3). See Appendix A for the full Mississippi
statute, which should be repealed.
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directly to any organized fire suppression agency recognized by the
Mississippi Forestry Commission all the costs the agency incurred
related to the suppression and abatement of the fire.155
Robbery is the next crime that blends property and personendangerment. We will discuss it next.
IV. ROBBERY
Robbery at common law was a serious crime because it was theft
committed by force or threat, in other words, by terrorizing the victim.156
The drafters thought that robbery should still be considered a serious crime
because of the element of terror and danger to persons, in combination with
the theft or attempted theft.157 These offenses could be separately punished,
but the drafters thought that robbery deserved separate and serious
treatment because the actor “generates severe and widespread insecurity by
indiscriminately assailing anyone who may be despoiled of property.”158
Also, robbery has a long tradition in the criminal law, even if it could be
broken into separate offenses.159 The principal problem the drafters
addressed was defining and grading various forms of threats.160
The Committee adopted the substance of the Model Code provision
regarding robbery, but rearranged, refined, and made some important
changes to the crime.161 Some of the changes to the Model Code, but not
all—since the statute was substantially re-written—are indicated by
underlining and strikeouts. The original Model Code version of the crime
is provided in the footnotes for comparison purposes.162 The version of
robbery that the Committee is recommending is as follows:

155. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0, as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
156. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 cmt. at 96 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
157. See id. at 98.
158. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 116 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
159. See id.
160. See id. at 98-99.
161. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL
PENAL CODE § 222.1 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10,
2020).
162 § 222.1. Robbery.
(1) Robbery Defined. A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of
committing a theft, he:
(a) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another; or
(b) threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate
serious bodily injury; or
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Section 222.1 Robbery
(1) A person is guilty of robbery, as a first degree felony if, in the
course of committing a theft, he:
(a) attempts to kill another; or
(b) purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily
injury upon another.
(2) A person is guilty of robbery, as a second degree felony if, in the
course of committing a theft, he:
(a) recklessly inflicts serious bodily injury upon another; or
(b) threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of
immediate serious bodily injury; or
(c) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony
of the first or second degree.
(3) A person is guilty of robbery, as a third degree felony if, in the
course of committing a theft he:
(a) recklessly inflicts bodily injury upon another; or
(b) threatens to inflict serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony
not of the first or second degree; or
(d) takes property from another by force.
An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing a theft” under
sections (1), (2) or (3) if it occurs in an attempt to commit a theft, as
defined under Section 223.1, or in flight after the attempt or
commission.
(4) A person is guilty of robbery, as a fourth degree felony, if he
purposely obtains property of another by threatening to:
(a) inflict serious bodily injury, as defined by section 210.0;
or
(b)(a) inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other
criminal offense; or
(c) (b) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or
(d) (c)expose any secret tending to subject any person to
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or
business repute; or

(c) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony of the first
or second degree.
An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing a theft” if it occurs in an
attempt to commit theft or in flight after the attempt or commission.
(2) Grading. Robbery is a felony of the second degree, except that it is a felony
of the first degree if in the course of committing the theft the actor attempts to
kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
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(e) (d)take or withhold action as an official, or cause an
official to take or withhold action; or
(f) (e) bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or other
collective unofficial action if the property is not demanded
or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the
actors purports to act; or
(f) testify or provide any information or withhold testimony
or information with respect to another’s legal claim or
defense; or
(g) (g) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the
actor that would not in itself substantially benefit the actor
but that is calculated to harm substantially another person
with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career,
financial condition, reputation, or personal relationships.
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraph (b),
(c), (d), (e), (f) or (g) that the property obtained by threat or
accusation, exposure, lawsuit, or other invocation or official action
was then honestly claimed as restitution or indemnification for harm
done in the circumstances to which such accusation, exposure,
lawsuit, or other official action relates, or as compensation for
property or lawful service.163
The original Model Code version of article 222 contains one
section, section 222.1, which proscribes robbery.164 The Committee added
a definition section to article 222165 and broke robbery into four degrees of
felonies, as opposed to the Model Code’s two degrees.166
Under the original version of the Model Code, robbery requires
threat or force in the course of a theft. The seriousness of the punishment
depends on the actor’s state of mind and how serious the threat or force is.
Robbery under the Model Code may be a first or second degree felony.167
The Committee agreed with this version of the first and second degree
felonies. However, the Committee expanded on this, so that robbery may

163. MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra
note 25 (July 10, 2020; August 14, 2020).
164. See supra note 162.
165. Section 222.0 Definitions.
In this Article, the definitions given in Section 210.0 and Section 223.0 apply
unless a different meaning plainly is required.
MODEL PENAL CODE §222.0 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July
10, 2020).
166. Minutes, supra note 25 (July10, 2020).
167. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
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be an offense in the first, second, third or fourth degree.168 The common
thread is that the force or threat must be “in the course of a theft” for all
degrees, except for fourth degree robbery.169 As discussed below, fourth
degree robbery was extracted from the theft article and is the Model Code’s
version of extortion.170
Theft under the Model Code171 consolidates into a single theft crime
all the common law theft crimes—larceny, embezzlement and false
pretenses—as well as related offenses, such as extortion, blackmail and
receiving stolen property.172 The conduct required is broken down into
several sections under the Model Code.173 The Committee chose to
consolidate the offense into one section of theft with several subsections
that roughly correspond to the Model Code sections.174 Because robbery
under subsections (1), (2) and (3) requires a theft, it could be accomplished
by any of the conduct prohibited under the theft section, section 223.1(2),
as proposed by the Committee.175 Generally, robbery is accomplished in
the course of committing larceny,176 but under the consolidated theft
provision, theft could be committed in any manner defined as such.177
Since robbery could be committed in the course of attempted theft or flight,
it is possible that one committing theft by embezzlement, for example,
could be guilty of robbery, if thwarted in his attempt or flight.178
Because common law larceny required the actor to actually take
possession and carry away property of another with the intent to steal it, if
the actor only attempted to obtain property, he would not be guilty of
168. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
169. Id.
170. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL
PENAL CODE § 222.1(4) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10,
2020).
171. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
172. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 cmt. at 122 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
173. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
174. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (January, 2019).
175. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (January, 2019). This was not expressed in the Model Code version, so the
Committee added in section 222.0(2) that the definitions of the theft article 223 apply to
article 222. We also added in section 222.1 that theft is defined in article 223. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 222.1 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10,
2020; August 14, 2020.).
176. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1046-47.
177. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (January, 2019).
178. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
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larceny or, necessarily, of robbery.179 Such conduct presents the same
danger to persons, whether property is actually obtained or not. Thus, if the
prohibited conduct occurs in the attempt to commit a theft, the actor should
be guilty of robbery.180 Unlike the common law, which punished any
attempt as a misdemeanor, attempt under the Model Code is punished the
same as the crime intended.181 However, the exception to that rule is that,
if the intended offense is a felony in the first degree, attempt is a second
degree felony.182 Punishing an attempted theft as robbery allows first
degree punishment for what would otherwise be attempted robbery, if the
remaining elements of the offense are met.
In addition, because some forms of robbery require only
recklessness, and attempt requires purposefulness, applying attempt to all
the elements of robbery could be problematic.183 Defining attempted theft
as robbery requires purposefulness only with regard to the theft, not to all
of the elements of robbery.184 Therefore, if the actor intends to commit a
theft, takes a substantial step toward that end, and in the process recklessly
inflicts serious bodily injury, he is guilty of robbery, not just attempted theft
and assault.185
Another issue that must be addressed is that the theft article provides
for a general claim-of-right defense, which allows an affirmative defense
when, among other things, the actor honestly believes that he has a claim to
the property.186 This may seem redundant because the actor has to
purposely obtain property of another in some way, so that if his belief is
mistaken that the property is his and not that of another, he would not be
guilty of theft. The claim of right defense operates to reinforce that the
actor has a defense for the theft element of robbery if he acts in the mistaken
179. See LAFAVE supra note 48, at 1048.
180. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 cmt. at 99-100 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
181. See supra note 48.
182. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05 (1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
183. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 cmt. at 103 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
184. See id.
185. See supra note 48. See also Johnson, supra note 11, at III.A.
186. (4) Claim of Right. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for theft that
the actor:
(a) was unaware that the property or service was that of another; or
(b) acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service
involved or that he had right to acquire or dispose of it as he did;
(c) took property exposed for sale, intending to purchase and pay for it
promptly, or reasonably believing that the owner, if present, would
have consented.
MODEL PENAL CODE §223.1(4) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra
note 25 (January, 2019).
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belief that the property is his.187 In addition, the defense applies when the
actor knows that the property is that of another, but believes that he has an
honest claim to it, or he reasonably believed that the owner would have
consented, or he thought he had the right to deal with the property in the
way he did.188 In these cases, he may have the claim-of-right defense,
which could operate in appropriate cases to preclude a robbery conviction
under subsections (1), (2) and (3). For example, if the actor attempts to kill
or inflicts serious bodily injury under subsection (1), if he believed that he
had a claim to the property, he would not be guilty of robbery. He would
still be guilty of aggravated assault or attempted murder.189 This is
consistent with the common law view that if the actor would not be guilty
of theft, he would also not be guilty of robbery.190
Robbery under subsection (4) does not require a theft, however, but
rather “obtaining property of another,” so the general claim-of-right defense
from the theft article is not automatically incorporated into subsection
(4).191 There is a more limited affirmative defense in subsection (4) that
operates somewhat like the claim-of-right defense in the other subsections.
However, the Committee decided that this defense would not apply if the
actor purposely obtains property of another while threatening to inflict
bodily injury or commit any other criminal offense under subsection
(4)(a).192 So the actor would be guilty of robbery, a felony in the fourth
degree, under subsection (4), even if he thought he might have a claim to
the property but was purposely obtaining the property of another by
threatening bodily injury and some other criminal offense.193
For the first three degrees, the first question, then, is what does “in
the course of committing a theft” mean? The Model Code definition, which
the Committee adopted, adding some clarifying language in this regard, is
as follows:
An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing a theft” under
sections (1), (2) or (3), if it occurs in an attempt to commit a theft,
187. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 153 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
188. See id. at 155.
189. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05 (1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) requires that to be
guilty of attempt, the actor must be purposeful regarding the target crime, in this case
murder under MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Aggravated assault
under MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985), however, may be
committed if the actor is reckless.
190. See LAFAVE supra note 48, at 1046-47.
191. See infra note 249 and discussion accompanying notes 249-59.
192. The defense would usually not apply to another subsection, (4)(g), either,
but it is not precluded. See infra note 256 and discussion accompanying notes 287-290.
193. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
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as defined under Section 223.1, or in flight after the attempt or
commission.194
“In the course of” thus covers the attempted theft, the accomplished theft
and the flight from a theft or attempted theft.195 If the threatening behavior
occurs during this time frame, it should be punished as robbery. One who
uses force in order to escape from his crime is the kind of actor who would
have used force to accomplish the theft and is considered just as
dangerous.196 There is no time limit on how long the flight lasts; however,
such considerations are appropriate for judicial interpretation, perhaps with
reference to the law regarding “fresh pursuit.”197
There is no requirement that the theft be “from the person or in the
presence of the victim.”198 In these days of electronic communication, the
victim could be compelled to disgorge funds electronically to avoid being
shot, for example. In addition, there is no requirement that the victim of
the theft be the one threatened or attacked.199 Under all of the robbery
offenses, the threat or attempt does not have to be against the victim of the
theft, but to “another,” meaning other than the actor.200 However,
subsection (2)(b), threatening to inflict serious bodily injury, requires an
immediate threat, as opposed to extortion under subsection (4), which does
not require that the threat to be immediate.201 The distinction between the
threats under subsection (4) and subsection (2) is that under subsection (2),
the threat could be carried out immediately and/or the threatened harm is
more serious.202 The two factors, immediacy and seriousness of threat,
justify the difference in penalty,203 as discussed further below.204 The

194. MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(4) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). The original version of the Model Code did not reference
the theft article, MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985), so the Committee
thought that should be clarified. Also, as discussed below, when we added extortion to
robbery, we needed to clarify that “in the course of” applied to sections (1)-(3). Id.
195. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
196. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 cmt. at 112 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
197. See id. at 104.
198. See id. at 112.
199. See id. at 110.
200. See id.
201. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(2(b) as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(4)(a) as
adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
202. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 cmt. at 110-11 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
203. See id.
204. See infra note 236 discussion accompanying notes 235-39.
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threatening behavior implies purposefulness, although this is not
expressed.205
The seriousness of the threat or force is the second important
element and distinguishes the various grades of robbery. The Model Code
drafters were concerned that robbery should be distinguished from ordinary
theft from the person, which is addressed under the theft article.206 In order
to accomplish this, the drafters recognized only two forms of robbery, both
of which required threats of death or serious bodily injury or a threat of a
felony in the first or second degree.207 Most states thought that this was too
restrictive,208 and the Committee agreed, adding two more forms of robbery
to the statute.209
Under the statute as re-drafted by the Committee, the most serious
form of robbery occurs while in the course of committing a theft, the actor
attempts to kill another or “purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious
bodily injury.”210 The drafters considered this to be such a serious offense
that it was classified as a felony in the first degree, and the Committee
agreed.211 The Committee, however, as with the other subsections,
addressed the penalty for the offense in each subsection, while the Model
Code addressed the issue in a separate subsection on grading.212
Subsection (1) requires that the actor be purposeful throughout in
attempting to kill or inflicting or attempting serious bodily injury.213
Requiring purposefulness identifies the most dangerous offenders and
justifies the more serious penalty.214 If the harm actually occurs, then that
offense would also be punished.
The second most serious form of robbery is punished under
subsection (2) as a second degree felony.215 Robbery under subsections
205. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 114 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
206. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 cmt. at 103 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
207. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
208. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 106 (AM. LAW INST. 1980)
209. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL
PENAL CODE §222.1 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10,
2020; August 2020).
210. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
211. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL
PENAL CODE §222.1(1) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10,
2020).
212. Id.
213. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(1) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
214. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 114 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
215. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with
MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(2) (a) & (b) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra
note 25 (July 10, 2020).
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(2)(a) and (b) occurs when, while in the course of committing a theft, the
actor recklessly inflicts—or threatens or purposely puts another in fear of—
immediate serious bodily injury.216 In addition, there is a final possibility
for robbery under the original version of the Model Code, which was
adopted by the Committee, and that is, if the in the course of the theft, the
actor commits or threatens immediately to commit a felony in the first or
second degree.217 This type of robbery is also classified as a felony in the
second degree under subsection (2)(c).218
Besides arrangement of the statute, the only other difference
between the Model Code version of robbery as a second degree offense and
the Committee’s version is the express addition of the mens rea of
recklessness for inflicting serious bodily injury.219 The Model Code did not
add the term “reckless,” but relied on the operation of section 2.02 to supply
it.220 Whenever possible, the Committee expressed mens rea in each
particular statute, rather than relying on section 2.02 to supply the mens rea
of at least recklessness when mens rea is not expressed.221 The Committee
thought that so much reliance on section 2.02 was a mistake on the part of
the drafters.222
The remainder of the statute is different from the original version of
the Model Code. The Committee decided that there were gaps in the
robbery statute proposed by the drafters, so subsections (3) and (4) were
added to cover other conduct that should be punished as robbery.223
Under subsection (3)(a), robbery is a felony in the third degree, if in
the course of committing theft or attempted theft, the actor recklessly
inflicts any bodily injury upon another, as opposed to serious bodily injury

216. MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(2) (a) & (b) as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
217. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
218. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(1)(c) & (2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985)
with MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(2)(c) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra
note 25 (July 10, 2020).
219. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with
MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(2)(a) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25
(July 10, 2020).
220. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 118 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
221. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (September 2006). See Johnson, supra note 1, at 120 for more explanation
of section 2.02.
222. Id.
223. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL
PENAL CODE §222.1 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10,
2020; August 14, 2020).
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required under subsection (2).224 Bodily injury as defined under the Model
Code and adopted by the Committee is not merely offensive touching, as
defined by the common law,225 but requires “physical pain, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition.”226 The Committee decided that
recklessly inflicting bodily injury was deserving of a third degree felony
punishment because of the special circumstance of robbery that causes
widespread fear among the populace because of the element of violence
added to the theft or attempted theft.227
Similarly, the Committee also considered that threatening to inflict
serious bodily injury to accomplish the theft was sufficiently serious, even
if the threat to do so is not immediate, as required under subsection (2).228
Subsection (3)(b) adds such a threat as a third degree felony.229 While
subsection (2) proscribes theft or attempted theft while committing or
threatening felonies in the first or second degree,230 the Committee thought
that committing or threatening to immediately commit any other felony
would be sufficient for robbery as a third degree felony, as proscribed in
subsection (3).231
Finally, the Committee added “taking property from another by
force” as subsection 3(d).232 A purse-snatching would otherwise be
punished as theft, and—depending on the value of property—the offense
could be punished as just a misdemeanor.233 But because such a crime
causes the same fright and possible to danger to persons, the Committee
decided to add such conduct to the third degree version of robbery.234
We also decided to move extortion from the theft article235 to
subsection (4) of robbery236 because the conduct required of both crimes
224. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(3)(a) as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(2)(a) as
adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
225. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 185 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
226. See supra note 165 and accompanying discussion.
227. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 98 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
228. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(3)(b) (as adopted by the
Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE §
222.1(2)(b) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
229. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(3)(b) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
230. Id. at § 222.1(2)(c).
231. Id. at § 222.1(3)(c).
232. Id. at § 222.1(3)(d).
233 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Minutes, supra note
25 (January, February, August 14, 2020).
234. Id. at § 222.1(3)(d).
235. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
236. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.4 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).

268

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 39:2

involves threats and intimidation.237 The essence of the crime is not really
the amount of property, which determines the punishment under theft, but
the distress to the person caused by threatening him. Along with other
states, the Committee believed that this conduct should be punished as
robbery, not theft, which is a purely property crime.238 The most obvious
difference between extortion and robbery, as commonly understood, is that
robbery requires an immediate threat, while extortion does not require the
threat to be immediate. In addition, the threats that constitute robbery are
usually more serious than the threats that constitute extortion.239
Thus, a person is guilty of robbery under subsection (4), which is a
felony in the fourth degree, if he purposely obtains the property of another
by certain listed threats.240 The Committee incorporated the definitions
from the article that covers theft, article 223, into article 222.241 The Model
Code defines property as basically “anything of value.”242 In addition, the
Model Code defines “property of another” to include property in which any
person other that the actor has an interest that the actor is not privileged to
infringe.243 “Obtain” means “to bring about a transfer or purported transfer
of a legal interest in property, whether to the obtainer or another.”244
237. See infra note 240 and discussion accompanying notes 240-94.
238. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (January, February, July 10, 2020).
239. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(1-3) as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (AM. LAW
INST. 1985).
240. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.4 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
241. Id. at § 222.0.
242. (7) “Property” means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and
intangible personal property, contract rights, choses-in-action and other interests in or
claims to wealth, credit and debit cards, credit extended by any license gaming
establishment, admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food
and drink, or electric or other power.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.0(7) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra
note 25 (January, 2019).
243. (8) “Property of another” includes property in which any person other that
the actor has an interest which the actor is not privileged to infringe, regardless of the
fact that the actor has an interest in the property and regardless of the fact that the other
person might be precluded from civil recovery because the property was used in an
unlawful transaction or was subject to forfeiture as contraband. Property in possession of
the actor shall not be deemed property of another who has only a security interest therein,
even if legal title is in the creditor pursuant to a conditional sales contract other security
agreement.
Id. at § 223.0(8). See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 166-74 (AM. LAW
INST. 1980) for a complete explanation of these definitions. I plan to cover theft in the
next article.
244. (6) “Obtain: means:
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The threat does not have to be explicit, and it may be written or
oral.
In addition, as with the other subsections of robbery, the person
who is the object of the threatened harm does not have to be the victim of
the threat or attempted threat.246 There is no requirement that the person
from whom the property is extorted be related in any way to the object of
the threatened harm.247 The jury may decide whether the threat to injure an
unrelated third person is sufficient to prove the actor’s purpose.248
Because robbery under subsection (4) was originally conceived of
as a property crime under the theft article, there was a claim-of-right
defense that applied to this subsection when it was part of theft.249 As
discussed above, theft requires that the actor be purposeful in obtaining
property of another.250 If he has a claim that he honestly believes that he is
entitled to the property, he should not be guilty of theft, and therefore not
guilty of robbery. The claim-of-right defense also applies in other
situations.251 However, as opposed to the other subsections of robbery,
subsection (4) does not require proof of theft, but only obtaining property
of another by threats. Therefore, the claim-of-right defense under section
223.1 does not apply to this subsection.252 As with robbery under the other
subsections, if the actor believes that the property is his and not that of
another, he is also not guilty of robbery under subsection (4) because he
lacks the necessary intent to commit the offense.253 However, as discussed
earlier,254 a specific affirmative defense, similar to a claim-of-right defense,
is nevertheless necessary for this subsection, but is not applicable in all
cases.255
The affirmative defense may be available under subsection (4), if
the property obtained was honestly claimed as restitution or
245

(a) in relation to property, to bring about a transfer or purported transfer of a
legal interest in the property, whether to the obtainer or another, or
(b) in relation to labor or service, to secure performance thereof.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.0(6) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Minutes, supra note 25
(January, 2019).
245. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 205-06 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
246. See id. at 206-07.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. MODEL PENAL CODE §223.1(4) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (January 2019; July 10, 2020).
250. See supra note 242 and discussion accompanying notes 236-39.
251. See supra note 249 and discussion accompanying notes 186-90.
252. See id.
253. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020; August 14, 2020).
254. See supra note 186 and discussion accompanying notes 191-93.
255. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 204-05 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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indemnification for the harm that relates to the threat or “as compensation
for property or lawful service.”256 The Committee decided that threats to
inflict bodily injury or to commit another crime under subsection (4)(a)
should not be subject to the affirmative defense. These threats are
considered more important to punish than the property crime involved.257
In addition, the affirmative defense would not usually apply to subsection
(4)(g), which requires the actor to threaten any other harm that does not
benefit him; however, the defense is not precluded for subsection (4)(g).
Otherwise, the affirmative defense is applicable under subsection (4) if the
threat was to obtain property honestly claimed as restitution or
indemnification for harm done or as lawful compensation.258 It should be
noted that the Committee added to the affirmative defense that the actor
“then claimed and honestly believed” to clarify that this claim must be made
at the time of the threat and not as an after-the-fact justification.259
The listed threats begin in subsection (4)(a) with threatening “to
inflict bodily injury upon anyone or commit any other criminal offense.”260
The threat in subsection 4(a) does not have to immediate.261 However, if
the threat was immediate and of serious bodily injury, this would be a
second degree felony under subsection (2).262 When the threat was not
immediate, but the threat was of serious bodily injury, it would be
punishable under subsection (3), as a third degree felony.263 A threat to
commit bodily injury of any kind would be a fourth degree felony under
section (4)(a).264
As discussed above, the general claim-of-right defense under the
theft article, article 223.1,265 does not apply to subsection (4), since this
subsection is no longer a part of theft. In addition, the specific affirmative
256. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(a) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
261. Id.
262. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(2)(b) as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(a) as
adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
263. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(3)(b) as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). with MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(a) as
adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
264. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(a) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (January 2019; August 14, 2020).
265. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(4) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (February 8, 2019).
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defense that applies to this subsection does not cover subsection (4)(a).266
Therefore, there is no defense in the statute that applies to subsection (4)(a).
As discussed earlier,267 although the actor may not be guilty of robbery
under subsections (1), (2), and (3) because he believes he has a claim to the
property, he may be guilty under subsection (4)(a), as long as he is
purposely obtaining the property of another.268
The second listed threat under subsection (4)(b) is to accuse anyone
of a criminal offense.269 As noted earlier,270 the affirmative defense
specifically covers the situation in which the “property was honestly
claimed as restitution or indemnification for the harm done” or as lawful
compensation.271 However, it is irrelevant whether the threat is true or
false.272 Therefore, in a negotiation for relief in a civil action, if the remedy
were honestly claimed, it would not be robbery under this subsection to
threaten a criminal charge.273
The third listed threat in subsection (4)(c) is to expose “any secret
tending to subject the person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair
his credit or business repute.”274 The affirmative defense applies to this
paragraph because threatening to expose such a secret could be considered
a legitimate negotiating technique to get restitution or indemnification, for
example.275
The fourth listed threat in subsection (4)(d) is to “take or withhold
action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action.”276 This
could also be bribery under section 240.1,277 if all of the elements are
met.278 Bribery requires pecuniary benefit or any benefit in exchange for

266. Id. Minutes, supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
267. See supra discussion accompanying notes 191-93.
268. See supra note 256.
269. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(b) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (January 2019; August 14, 2020).
270. See supra note 256 and discussion accompanying notes 256-59.
271. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
272. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 212 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
273. See id. at 213.
274. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(c) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
275. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 215 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
276. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(4)(d) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
277. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 217 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
278. Section 240.1 Bribery in Official and Political Matter
A person is guilty of bribery, a felony of the third degree, if he offers, confers,
or agrees to confer upon another, or solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept from
another:
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official action, as opposed to robbery, which requires attempting to obtain
or obtaining anything of value.279 Robbery requires a threat, while bribery
does not.280 The affirmative defense applies to subsection (4)d), so that
official action may be threatened if the actor has an honest belief that he is
entitled to compensation, restitution or indemnification.281
The fifth listed threat in subsection (4)(e) covers threatening
collective action that is not for the benefit of the group represented.282 This
paragraph covers the situation in which the union leader was threatening a
strike if the employer does not pay him an amount of money.283 The
affirmative defense applies to subsection (4)e); however, if the threat of
collective action was for the benefit of the group, the actor would not be
guilty under this paragraph in any event.284
Subsection (4)(f), the sixth listed threat, applies to threats to testify
or provide information or withhold testimony or information regarding the
legal claim or defense of another.285 The affirmative defense would apply
here if the actor honestly claimed that he was entitled to restitution or
indemnification for the harm done or as lawful compensation. However,
this conduct could also be bribery of a witness or intimidation of a witness,
if all the elements of that crime were met.286
(1) any pecuniary benefit as consideration for the recipient's decision, opinion,
recommendation, vote or other exercise of discretion as a public servant or party
official; or voter or
(2) any benefit as consideration for the recipient's decision, vote,
recommendation or other exercise of official discretion in a judicial or
administrative proceeding; or
(3) any benefit as consideration for a violation of a known legal duty as public
servant or party election official.
It is no defense to prosecution under this section that a the person
whom the actor sought to be influenced was not qualified to act in the desired
way, whether because he had not yet assumed office, or lacked jurisdiction, or
for any other reason.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra
note 25 (February, 2020).
279. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (February 14, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 (as
adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (February 14, 2020).
280. Id.
281. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 217 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
282. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(e) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
283. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 218 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
284. See id.
285. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(f) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
286. The Committee adopted the following version of intimidation or bribery of
witnesses, which was based on the current Mississippi Code statutes:
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The seventh and last threat in subsection (4)(g) is a catchall. The
original version of the Model Code expressed this part as a threat to “inflict
any other harm that would not benefit the actor.”287 The Committee decided
that this was confusing and needed some limiting and explanatory
language, which we borrowed the Alabama code.288 Paragraph (g) now
covers harm that would not substantially benefit the actor but that is
calculated to substantially harm another person “with respect to his health,
safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal
relationships.”289 The Model Code comments provide some examples,
such as a law professor who extorts money from his students by threatening
to give them bad grades.290 Although not precluded, the affirmative defense
usually does not apply to this paragraph because the harm, a bad grade,
would not benefit the actor, and he has no claim to the money he is extorting
from the students, which is necessary to claim the defense.
As noted earlier, subsection (4) is related to theft but does not use
the term.291 Also, robbery under subsection (4) is closely related to criminal
coercion covered by section 212.5292 The purpose of the threats under
Section 241.xx Intimidation or Bribery of a Witness
A person commits a felony in the third degree if he attempts by force,
deception, offer of any pecuniary benefit or threat or other form of intimidation
to induce a witness or a person he believes will be called as a witness in any
official proceeding to:
(a) testify or inform falsely; or
(b) unlawfully withhold any testimony, information, document or
thing; or
(c) elude legal process summoning him to testify or supply evidence;
or
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he
has been legally summoned.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241xx Minutes, supra note 25 (July 12, 2019)
287. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4(7) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
288. ALA. CODE § 13A-8-1(14)(k) (West, Westlaw through 2021, No. 21-76).
289. MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(4) (g) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
290. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 223 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
291. See supra note 256 and discussion accompanying notes 186-93.
292. Section 212.5 Criminal Coercion
(1) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of criminal coercion if, with purpose
unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to engage or refrain from
engaging in conduct to his detriment, he recklessly threatens, explicitly or
implicitly, to:
(a) commit any criminal offense; or
(b) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or
(c) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt
or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute; or
(d) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or
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criminal coercion is to limit the victim’s freedom of action, as opposed to
subsection (4), the purpose of which is to obtain property.293 The list of
threats under criminal coercion is not as comprehensive as the list under
subsection (4) because the purpose is more clearly defined under the
latter.294
The next crime, burglary, is the final crime that combines the idea
of danger to persons and, somewhat incorrectly, danger to property. Of the
three crimes addressed in this article, burglary has veered further from its
original purpose of protecting people in their homes.295 We will discuss
burglary and related offenses next.

withhold action. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on
paragraphs (b), (c) or (d) that the actor reasonably believed the
accusation or secret to be true or the proposed official action justified
and that his purpose was limited to compelling the other to behave in a
way reasonably related to the circumstances which were the subject of
the accusation, exposure or proposed official action, as by desisting
from further misbehavior, making …good a wrong done, refraining
from taking any action or responsibility for which the actor believes
the other disqualified.
(2) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that:
(a) the actor reasonably believed the accusation or secret to be true or
the proposed action justified, and
(b)(i) that the primary purpose of the threat was to cause the other to
conduct himself in his own best interest; or
(b)(ii) that a purpose of the threat was to cause the other to desist from
immoral or unreasonable conduct, engage in behavior from which he
could not lawfully abstain, make good a wrong done by him, or refrain
from taking any action or responsibility for which he was disqualified.
(2)
(3) Grading.
(a) Criminal Coercion is a felony in the third degree if the threat is to
commit a felony in the first or second degree or the actor’s purpose is
felonious in the first or second degree.
(b) Criminal Coercion is a felony in the fourth degree if the threat is to
commit a felony in the third degree or the actor’s purpose is to commit
a felony in the third degree.
(c) Otherwise, Criminal Coercion is a Class A Misdemeanor.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra
note 25 (June 8, 2018). See Johnson supra note 11, at IV.E for a complete discussion of
criminal coercion.
293. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (June 8, 2018) with MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(4) as adopted by
the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).
294. See Johnson supra note 11, at IV.E.
295. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1079-80.
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V. BURGLARY AND OTHER RELATED OFFENSES.
Article 221 of the Model Code addresses burglary and another less
serious criminal intrusion, criminal trespass.296 The Committee added
some more specialized criminal intrusions, proscribed under the current
code.297
A. Burglary
Under the common law, burglary was considered an inherently
dangerous crime because “breaking and entering the dwelling of another in
the night time with the intent to commit a felony”298 threatened the safety
of the occupants.299 It was classified as a crime against habitation (where
people lived) and occupation,300 when people were likely to be there.301
Felonies were few at common law, and any person who was intending to
commit a felony was considered to be a dangerous character.302 Statutory
changes to burglary became common in more recent times, so that burglary
was no longer a threat to habitation but more of a property crime.303
Burglary could be committed by entering any structure, even a salvation
army box,304 thus it was no longer a crime against habitation.305 In addition,
under most statutes burglary could be committed in the daytime, when it
was not as likely that anyone would be home, so the crime lost its
justification as an implied threat to persons.306 Furthermore, many statutes
required only that the defendant be in the commission of any crime, thus
losing the seriousness implied by the felony requirement.307 The Model
Code provision was designed to hew more to the original purpose of
296. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
297. See infra Section V. C.
298. See PERKINS, supra note 13, at 192.
299. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 61,67 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
300. See PERKINS, supra note 13, at 192.
301. See, e.g., People v. Gauze, 542 P. 2d 1365, 1366 (Cal. 1975).
302. The punishment for a felony was hanging. BLACKSTONE, WILLIAM, AND
WILLIAM CAREY JONES. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. Vol. 2, BancroftWhitney, 1915-1916. The Making of Modern Law: Legal Treatises, 1800–1926,
https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/F0152900037/MOML?u=jack98403&sid=MOML&xid=1
95be867. Accessed 20 Aug. 2020. Also, “[n]o crime was considered a felony which did
not occasion a total forfeiture of the offender’s lands or good or both.” Kurtz v. Moffitt,
115 U.S. 487, 499 (1885).
303. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1069-70.
304. See, e.g., State v. Mann, 628 P.2d 361 (Ariz. 1981).
305. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1077.
306, See id.
307. See id. at 1078-79.
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burglary and that is to punish the threat to habitation and persons more
commensurately, as opposed to other less serious forms of criminal
intrusions.308
The Model Code drafters had considered whether to eliminate
burglary as a separate offense.309 Since burglary was punished separately
from the felony intended, it was a type of attempt crime.310 The drafters
opined that the reason that a separate burglary crime was necessary was
because of the inadequacies in the law of attempt, as discussed earlier.311
Attempt was punished as a misdemeanor at common law, and the defendant
had to be close to success to constitute attempt.312 These requirements were
ameliorated by the Model Code’s punishing attempt as seriously as the
crime intended in most cases and requiring only a substantial step, not a
near-miss.313
The drafters ultimately decided that burglary, properly defined,
should be criminally punished because the unexplained intrusion to commit
a crime is often more of a threat than the crime intended.314 Also, the
prosecution has more latitude in proving the defendant’s criminal purpose
under a burglary statute, which could have a number of criminal purposes,
as opposed to attempt, which requires proof that the purpose was to commit
a specific target crime.315 In addition, burglary is deeply embedded in the
Anglo-American tradition of keeping people safe in their homes.316
The Committee adopted the Model Code’s version of burglary with
a few changes as indicated by the underlined and stricken portions as
follows:317
Section 221.1 Burglary
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or surreptitiously
remains in a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or
occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit a crime therein,
unless the premises are at that time open to the public or the actor is
licensed or privileged to enter or remain. It is an affirmative defense

308. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 67 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
309. See id.at 66.
310. See id. at 63.
311. See id. at 62-63; supra note 48.
312. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 63 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
313. See Johnson, supra note 11, at III.A.
314. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 67 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
315. See id. at 68
316. See id. at 67
317. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1) as adopted by the Committee (July 10,
2020). Minutes, supra note 25 (July 14, 2020).

2021] REFORMING THE MISSISSIPPI CRIMINAL CODE PART III

277

to prosecution for burglary that the building or structure was
abandoned.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the second degree if it is perpetrated in
the dwelling of another at night, of if, in the course of committing
the offense, the actor:
(a) purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to
inflict bodily injury on anyone; or
(b) is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon.
Otherwise, burglary is a felony in the third degree. An act shall
be deemed “in the course of committing” an offense if it occurs
in an attempt to commit the offense or in flight after the attempt
or commission.
(3). A person may not be convicted both for burglary and for the
offense that which it was his purpose to commit after the burglarious
entry or for an attempt to commit that offense, unless the additional
offense constitutes a felony of the first or second degree.
Burglary, as proposed by the Committee, is entering or remaining
surreptitiously in a building absent permission.318 If the burglary is into a
dwelling, the offense is a felony in the second degree.319 In other words, as
adopted by Committee,320 if the threat is to a habitation, burglary is a crime
of the same seriousness as manslaughter.321 The Model Code added other
enhancements that elevate the crime to a second degree felony: 1)
purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily
injury on anyone; or 2) being armed with explosives or a dangerous
weapon.322
The comments to the Model Code discussed four issues that
determine the seriousness of the offense: the nature of the entry, the place
of the entry, the actor’s purpose in entering, and factors that aggravate the
offense.323 The Committee agreed with the comments’ analysis, except
where indicated otherwise.

318. Id.
319. Id. at § 221.1(2).
320. The original version of the MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 1985) required a nighttime entry, which the Committee eliminated. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 221.1(1) as adopted by the Committee (July 10, 2020), as discussed infra
discussion accompanying notes 360-67.
321. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1) as adopted by the Committee (July 10,
2020). See discussion accompanying notes 299-308 and Johnson supra note 1, at 137.
322. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
323. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art 221.1 cmt. at 68 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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First, the nature of the entry must be unprivileged,324 in other
words, an actor may not be guilty of burglary in entering his own dwelling,
for example. This is derived from the common law requirement that the
entry must be into the dwelling of another.325 However, the requirement
that the entry must be unprivileged more particularly replaces the common
law requirement of “breaking,” which was defined as “making a physical
opening by trespass” (that is, without consent).326 Because breaking is
often difficult to prove, the requirement was either eliminated by statute327
or became little more than symbolic.328 Unprivileged entry would include
situations in which the premises are not open to the public, so that if the
premises were open to the public, even if a particular person or class of
persons, such as shoplifters, had been specifically prohibited from entering,
the crime of burglary is inappropriate.329 The unprivileged entry is thus not
expanded to include anyone who enters with a bad purpose, as some statutes
have done.330 The purpose is to limit burglary to surreptitious entries, in
keeping with the object of the revision, to limit burglary to situations that
aggravate the crime intended.331 Punishing a shoplifter for burglary is
significantly removed from the original purpose of keeping people safe in
their homes. The Committee chose to punish this conduct as criminal
trespass in the next subsection, discussed below.332
In addition to the requirement of unprivileged entry, the
Committee added “remaining surreptitiously in the structure.”333
Therefore, if the actor intends to commit a crime, he may be guilty of
burglary if he remains surreptitiously, unless he is privileged to remain or
the business is open to the public at the time.334 Thus, if a customer hides
and remains in the store after it is closed to the public to steal merchandise,
he could be guilty of burglary. This obviates the prosecutorial difficulty in
proving the actor’s original intent when he entered, if he remains secreted
on the premises after it is closed to the public.335 The original version of
the Model Code punished remaining in a structure as criminal trespass

324. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
325. See discussion accompanying notes 298-301.
326. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1070-71.
327. Id. at 1071.
328. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art 221.1 cmt. at 69 (AM. LAW INST. 1980)
329. See id. at 68.
330. See id. at 69.
331. See id.
332. See infra text accompanying note 382.
333. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
334. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE Art 221.1 cmt. at 69 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
335, Cf.id. at 70 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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under section 221.2, discussed below.336 However, the Committee thought
that this conduct was a logical addition to the burglary statute.337
The second issue discussed in the Model Code comments is the
type of structure involved. The Model Code burglary provision applies to
“a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion
thereof.”338 Again the purpose of burglary was to protect habitations, so
this requirement is more reminiscent of that purpose than current statutes
that allow burglary into automobiles and storage boxes.339
“Occupied structure” is defined in section 221.0(1) as “any
structure, vehicle or place adapted for overnight accommodation of
persons, or for carrying on business therein, whether or not a person is
actually present.”340 Thus, the place of entry must be into a habitation or a
business, so that stealing clothes from a Salvation Army box or a purse from
a passenger car would no longer be burglary. Both of these crimes lack the
aggravation required for burglary. Again the idea is still keeping people
safe, either in their homes or businesses, even if no one is actually present.
Intrusions into such places may still involve the same danger and alarm that
should be proscribed by burglary.341
Even if the place of entry is a vehicle, if it is adapted for
business—such as a food truck—or overnight occupancy—such as a motor
home—it could be the subject of burglary.342 Also, there is specific
protection for separately secured or occupied portions of a building so that
individual units of a building, such as hotel rooms and apartments, are
336, MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
337. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
338. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985); See MODEL PENAL
CODE Art 221.1 cmt. at 185 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
339. See supra note 304 and discussion accompanying notes 303-07.
340. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.0(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). The Committee
adopted the following definitions for this article:
Section 221.0. In this Article, unless a different meaning plainly is required:
(1) "occupied structure" means any structure, vehicle or place that is adapted for
overnight accommodation of persons, or for carrying on business therein,
whether or not a person is actually present.
(2) "night" means the period between thirty minutes past sunset and thirty
minutes before sunrise.
(3) “lawful” means compliance with any affirmative legal duty, whether it arises
under the criminal law, civil law, or administrative regulation.
(4) The definitions in section 210.0 are incorporated in this article where
applicable.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.0 as adopted by the Committee. See Minutes supra
note 25 (July 10, 2020).
341. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 72 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
342. See id. at 72-73.
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protected.343 However, there is an exclusion at the end of the subsection
(1) for abandoned premises, making it an affirmative defense if the place
entered was abandoned.344 The affirmative defense is again in keeping with
the purpose of preventing danger to people. The Model Code added
“building or occupied structure” on the assumption that any building would
be suitable for occupancy. If it was not suitable, the affirmative defense
that it was abandoned is available.345
The third issue addressed in the Model Code comments is the state
of mind required for the crime. As opposed to the common law requirement
of intent to commit a felony,346 the Model Code requires a purpose to
commit a crime therein.347 As noted, at common law, the intent to commit
a felony was crucial to the dangerousness of burglary.348 Statutory changes
in many jurisdictions had reduced this requirement to intent to commit any
crime.349 The drafters believed that the true danger lay in the unprivileged
entry with intent to commit a crime into a place where people could be
endangered.350 Therefore, the defendant may be guilty of burglary if he
intends to commit a felony or a misdemeanor. Intent to commit a felony
may be an aggravating factor, however, which will be discussed as the
fourth issue.351 Intent to commit only a violation is not sufficient to
constitute burglary under the Model Code.352
Since it is often difficult to ascertain the intention of the actor if
his purpose is not achieved, simply requiring that he intended to commit a
crime therein relieves the prosecutor of this burden.353 Also by adding the
word “therein,” the prosecutor must prove more than that the actor
trespassed because the trespass would have already been accomplished by
the unprivileged entry.354 If no independent criminal purpose is proven, the
actor could still be guilty of criminal trespass, discussed in the next
section.355
The fourth issue discussed in the Model Code comments involves
grading and aggravating factors. The Model Code classifies burglary as a

343. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
344. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 75 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
345. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 72-73 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
346. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1078.
347. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
348. See supra discussion accompanying note 302.
349. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1079.
350. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 75 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
351. See infra discussion accompanying notes 356-72.
352. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 75 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
353. See id at 78.
354. See id.
355. See infra text accompanying note 382.
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third degree felony,356 absent aggravating factors. One of the objectives of
the drafters was to rehabilitate burglary from the statutory changes that had
reduced it to little more than a property crime,357 often without a
proportionate reduction in the punishment.358 Along with the other changes
discussed above, the Model Code drafters added some aggravating factors
that would elevate burglary from a third degree felony to a second degree
felony.359
The first aggravating factor harkens back to the original purpose
of keeping people safe in their homes. Section 221.1(2) requires that for
burglary to be second degree felony, it must involve entry into a
dwelling.360 The original Model Code provision added “at night,” which
the Committee deleted, believing that the unprivileged entry into a dwelling
in the daytime is sufficiently dangerous to be an aggravated factor.361
Common law burglary required that the breaking and entering must be into
a dwelling at night.362 The crime was designed to protect habitation
(dwelling), which it did specifically. The nighttime requirement was to
protect occupancy (meaning that a person is present)363 because people
were likely to be home in that era at night, as opposed to the daytime and
that at night “honest men were more likely to fall prey to criminals.”364 This
is less likely to be true in the modern era, which the Committee recognized
by deleting the nighttime requirement.365 While it is true that entry during
the nighttime may cause more alarm, the Committee viewed the
requirement as unnecessary. In addition, even though the Committee
adopted the Model Code definition of nighttime for other purposes,366 the
nighttime requirement could still be difficult to prove in some cases and
had been eliminated by statute in many jurisdictions for this reason.367
356. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
357. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 75 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
358. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1079-81.
359. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
360. Id. at § 221.1(2).
361. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
362. See supra note 298 and discussion accompanying notes 298-302.
363. See PERKINS, supra note 13, at 192. The Model Code’s definition of
“occupied” is more akin to the definition of habitation. See id and MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 221.0(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
364. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1077.
365. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
366. Id. The definition of nighttime proposed by the Model Code and adopted
by the Committee is Section 221.0 (2) “‘night’ means the period between thirty minutes
past sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.0(2) (AM.
LAW INST. 1985)
367. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1077.
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The Model Code recognizes two other aggravating factors: when
the actor “purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict
bodily injury on anyone” or “is armed with explosives or a deadly
weapon.”368 Either of these conditions obviously increases the danger to
people. “Bodily injury” and “deadly weapon” are defined in section
210.0(2),369 which the Committee incorporated into this article.370 Attempt
is defined in section 5.01.371 Section 221.1(2) defines “in the course of
committing” the offense as “if it occurs in an attempt to commit the offense
or in flight after the attempt or commission.” 372
The last issue in grading concerns how multiple offenses are
treated. Burglary is in the nature of an attempt crime usually much more
serious than the burglarious intent, which is often to steal.373 However,
because of the seriousness of burglary, it generally did not merge into the
crime intended, nor did that crime merge into burglary.374 The Model Code
drafters believed that punishing non-aggravated burglary as a third degree
offense was sufficient and that if the crime intended was also a third degree
offense or misdemeanor, both crimes should not be separately charged.
However, if the crime intended was a first or second degree offense, both
burglary and the crime intended should be charged.375 Attempt to commit
the proposed crime is penalized the same as the crime intended.376
The Committee agreed with this position, but eliminated some of
the language.377
(3). A person may not be convicted both for burglary and for the
offense which it was his purpose to commit after the burglarious
entry or for an attempt to commit that offense, unless the additional
offense constitutes a felony of the first or second degree.378
The Committee thought that it was sufficiently clear that the subsection was
referring to the additional offense that the actor intended to commit without
368. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
369. See supra note 92.
370. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.0(4) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
371. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). See supra notes 48
and 311.
372. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
373. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1079.
374. Id. at 1080.
375, See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 83 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
376. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(3) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
377. Id.
378. Id.
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including the phrase “after the burglarious entry.” The phrase was not only
unnecessary, but it might also introduce the possibly confusing and
undefined term of “burglarious entry,” well known at common law but not
otherwise referenced in this statute.379
As noted above, when the prosecution is unable to prove that the
unprivileged entry was with the purpose of committing an independent
crime, the defendant may be charged with criminal trespass.380 We will
discuss that offense next.
B. Criminal Trespass
Criminal trespass under Section 221.2 is a lesser included offense
to burglary and is a misdemeanor because it does not include the element
of intent to commit a crime.381 The Committee adopted the following
version of criminal trespass with several changes to the Model Code
version. These changes are indicated by underlining for added words and
stricken words for deletions.
Section 221.2 Criminal Trespass
(1) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed
and privileged to do so, he enters or surreptitiously remains in any
building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied
portion thereof, or enters or remains on any land for the purpose of
hunting. An offense under this Subsection is a Class A misdemeanor
if it is committed in a dwelling at night. Otherwise it is a Class D
misdemeanor. petty misdemeanor.
(2) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed
or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any place as to which
notice against trespass is given by:
(a) actual communication to the actor; or
(b) posting in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably
likely to come to the attention of intruders; or
(c) fencing or other enclosure manifestly designed to
exclude intruders.
An offense under this Subsection constitutes a petty Class D
misdemeanor if the offender defies an order to leave personally
communicated to him by the owner of the premises or other
authorized person. Otherwise it is a violation.
379. See PERKINS, supra note 13, at 209-212.
380. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note at 26 (July 10, 2020).
381. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 92 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this Section
that:
(a) a building or occupied structure involved in an offense
under Subsection (1) was abandoned; or
(b) (a) The premises were at the time open to members of
the public, and the actor complied with all lawful conditions
imposed on access to or remaining in the premises; or
(c) (b) The actor reasonably believed that the owner of the
premises, or other person empowered to license access
thereto, would have licensed him to enter or remain.
(4) In this section, a person is not “licensed or privileged,” including
but not limited to, if he enters or remains in any place, including the
premises of any public housing authority, after having been
forbidden to do so, either orally, in writing, or by a sign posted at a
place in which it may reasonably be seen, by an owner, lessee,
custodian, or other authorized person, or by the administrators of
public housing authority, whether or not the person was invited by
a tenant.382
The Model Code did not seek to criminalize less serious forms of
trespass, such as entering unposted woodlands or open land, and the
Committee agreed.383 Such trespasses should be remedied in civil courts,
if at all.384 However, when the actor trespasses into a structure or enclosed
area or onto posted land, if he knows he has no license or privilege to do
so, this should be treated more seriously.385
There are two forms of criminal trespass punished under the
Section 221.2. The first, treated in subsection (1), encompasses the same
type of unprivileged entry or surreptitiously remaining in a building or
occupied structure386 or portion thereof as the Committee required of
burglary.387 If the person remains openly after his privilege has expired, he
may be guilty of trespass under subsection (2), a less serious offense. There
is not the same danger of alarm to persons as that posed by one hiding on

382. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
383. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
384, See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
385, See id. at 87.
386. “Occupied structure” is defined as “any structure, vehicle or place adapted
for overnight accommodation of persons, or for carrying on business therein, whether or
not a person is actually present.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.0(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
387. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
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the premises.388 The Committee also added to criminal trespass under
subsection (1) “entry into or remaining on land for the purpose of
hunting.”389
This first type of criminal trespass in subsection 221.2(1) is
punished as a Class D misdemeanor, unless it is into a dwelling at night,390
in which case the offense is a Class A misdemeanor. Because this type of
trespass could present the same alarm or danger to persons as burglary, even
if the actor had no other criminal purpose, a Class A misdemeanor
punishment was considered appropriate. If the trespass is not into a
dwelling at night but into any other building or occupied structure at any
time, the possibility of alarm to persons remains, so the trespass should still
be assigned misdemeanor punishment. In that case, as well as in the case
of entry to hunt, Class D misdemeanor punishment is justified.391 Even
though there is still the danger of alarm to persons that burglary addresses,
the fact that the actor is not intending a crime should lessen his
culpability.392
Criminal trespass under subsection (1) requires that the actor
know that he is not privileged or licensed to enter or remain in any building
or occupied structure or on land for the purpose of hunting.393 The
requirement of knowledge is defined under the Model Code, so that the
actor must be consciously aware that he is not allowed to be where he is.394
Criminal trespass under this section does not apply to inadvertent
trespassers and requires that the actor act with knowledge that he is not
privileged or licensed to enter or remain on the premises or land.395 The
Committee added subsection (4) to clarify that the permission of a tenant in
a public housing authority or other such building does not override notice
given by the housing authority or other such owner or authorized person.396
Subsection (4) also specifies that notice may be given either orally or in
388. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 92 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
389. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
390. “Night” is defined as “the period between thirty minutes past sunset and
thirty minutes before sunrise. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.0(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
391. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 92 (AM. LAW INST. 1980);
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
392. Id.
393. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(1) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
394. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). See
supra note 110.
395. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 88, 93-94 (AM. LAW INST.
1980)
396. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(4) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
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writing or by posting a sign that entry is forbidden by an individual or a
class of persons.397 This subsection was not intended to limit knowledge to
actual notice.398 Subsection (1) requires proof that the actor have
knowledge that he was not allowed to be where he is, however that
knowledge was obtained.399 With regard to subsection (1), knowledge
could be actual or inferred from general custom, for example, that a person
entering the house of another may only be privileged to do so under certain
circumstances.
Criminal trespass under subsection (2) involves entry or
remaining in any place without privilege or license, which may include
open land.400 If such land is entered with the purpose of hunting, this would
violate subsection (1);401 otherwise such entry could be criminal trespass
under subsection (2). Subsection (2) requires that the actor know he is not
licensed or privileged to enter.402 This could be in defiance of a notrespassing notice of some kind, either a posted or other written notice403 or
an oral communication by an authorized person.404 The subsection also
leaves open the possibility that the actor knew that he was not privileged if
he entered an enclosure manifestly designed to exclude intruders.405
Trespass under subsection (2) is punished as a violation, unless the actor is
a “defiant trespasser,” one who has received a personal order to leave, in
which case the offense is a Class D misdemeanor.406
There are three affirmative defenses in the Model Code to
criminal trespass.407 The first is that the building or occupied structure is
abandoned.408 However, the Committee did not adopt this affirmative
defense. If the actor knows he is not privileged or licensed to enter, the
Committee thought that it is irrelevant that the structure is abandoned.409
This idea is especially important when dealing with people trespassing to
hunt, which the Committee added to subsection (1). Even if the structure

397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at § 221.2(1).
400. Id. at § 221.2(2).
401. Id. at § 221.2(1).
402. Id. at § 221.2(2).
403. Id. at § 221.2(2)(b).
404. Id. at § 221.2(2)(a).
405. Id. at § 221.2(2)(c).
406. Id. at § 221.2(2).
407. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
408. Id. at § 221.2(3)(a).
409. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(3), as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
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is abandoned, the trespassing hunter should not be able raise abandonment
of the structure as a defense.410
The second affirmative defense in the Model Code is that the
premises are open to the public, and the actor complied with all lawful
conditions.411 The Committee adopted this defense and the following
definition of “lawful” for this article:
“lawful” means compliance with any affirmative legal duty,
whether it arises under the criminal law, civil law, or administrative
regulation.412
Therefore, if the premises are open to the public generally but certain people
or classes of people are barred by the owner, the question is whether the
restriction is lawful. It would be a violation of federal and possibly state
law to prohibit persons from entering based on their race, for example.413
The third affirmative defense in the Model Code is that the actor
reasonably believed that the owner or other authorized person would have
licensed him to enter or remain on the premises.414 “Reasonable belief,” as
adopted by the Committee, means that the actor was not criminally
negligent in his belief.415 In other words, to be guilty, the prosecutor must
prove that a reasonable person would not have believed that he would have
been given permission because there was a substantial risk that if he had
asked for permission to enter, it would not have been granted.
C. Other statutes adapted from the Mississippi Code
The Committee is also proposing to retain current Mississippi
statutes with enhanced penalties for certain trespasses that are considered
more serious. The section designated by the Committee as Section 221.3
provides for fourth degree felony punishment in subsection (1) for trespass
into premises where atomic machinery, rockets and other dangerous
410. Id.
411. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(3)(a), as adopted by the Committee.
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
412. Id. at § 221.0(3), as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 25
(July 10, 2020).
413. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
414. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(3)(b) as adopted by the Committee. Minutes,
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).
415. § 1.13 General Definitions . . . .
(16) “reasonably believes” or “reasonable belief” designates a belief that the
actor is not reckless or criminally negligent in holding.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note
25 (December 2006).
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devices are manufactured or operated with the purpose of committing any
crime.416 In subsection (2), the same penalty will be levied for simply
entering a restricted area of such premises.417 Both subsections require that
the actor know that he is not privileged or licensed to enter.418
The Committee also retained and updated the statute prohibiting
entry into the operations area of an airport, assigning this a Class A

416. Section 221.3 Trespass; entry on premises where atomic machinery,
rockets and other dangerous devices are manufactured or operated., etc.
A person commits a felony in the fourth degree if, knowing that he is not
licensed or privileged to do so, he knowingly:
(1) enters or trespass within the premises of any person, firm or corporation
manufacturing or constructing or erecting or assembling or maintaining or repairing or
operating any nuclear powered machinery, equipment or vessels, or rockets, missiles,
propulsion systems, explosives or other dangerous devices, or parts thereof, with the
intent purpose of committing to commit any crime under the laws of this state, or of the
United States, or pursuant to a conspiracy to commit any such crime or in an attempt to
commit any such crime. Any person convicted of a violation of this section shall be
adjudged guilty of a felony, and punished by a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($
5,000.00) or by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not to exceed five (5) years, or
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. Any person wilfully
entering or trespassing within such premises, if found within any area designated as a
restricted area therein, shall be guilty of a violation of this section.
(2) enters such any area designated as a restricted area therein within the
premises described in subsection (1).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.3 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes supra note
25 (September 14, 2018).
417. Id.
418. Id.
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misdemeanor penalty.419 These statutes were conformed to the Model Code
language and punishment, but were otherwise unchanged.420
VI. CONCLUSION
The clear definition of criminal offenses is fundamental to the fair
administration of criminal justice. Mississippi has failed in this regard by
having vague definitions of many crimes.421 Also, the Committee believed
that no one should be convicted of a crime without having criminal intent,
which should be clearly set out in the statute. Mississippi fails in this regard
also because many statutes either have no words that indicate criminal
intent, or the references to criminal intent are obscure.422 The object of this
series of articles is to advocate for a change in the criminal code toward
alleviating these concerns, as well to serve as an explanation of the
Committee’s work.
In this article, I have explained the Committee’s proposals to define
three areas of serious crimes that were conceived at common law to prevent
danger to persons posed by crimes that are often related to property—arson,
robbery and burglary. All of these crimes have been gradually transformed
into crimes that were more directed at protecting property, rather than
people, while retaining the same serious felony penalties.423 Perhaps of
most concern is that all three of these crimes are commonly crimes that
419. § 221.4 Trespass enhanced penalties for willful and malicious trespass
upon airport operations area
(1) Any person who shall be guilty of a willful or malicious trespass
upon the real or personal property of another, for which no other
penalty is prescribed, shall, upon conviction, be fined not exceeding
Five Hundred Dollars ($ 500.00), or imprisoned not longer than six (6)
months in the county jail, or both.
(a) Any person who shall willfully knowingly trespass upon any air
operations area or sterile area of an airport serving the general public
shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. and, upon conviction, shall
be fined not more than One Thousand Dollars ($ 1,000.00) or
imprisoned in the county jail for up to one (1) year, or both.
(b) For the purposes of this subsection (1), "air operations area" means
a portion of an airport designed and used for landing, taking off, or
surface maneuvering of airplanes; "sterile area" means an area to which
access is controlled by the inspection of persons and property in
accordance with an approved security program.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.4 as adopted by the Committee. Minutes supra note
25 (September 14, 2018).
420. See Appendix C for statutes to be repealed by Article 221.
421. See Johnson, supra note 1, at discussion accompanying notes 67-72.
422. See id.
423. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 4-5 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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form the basis for a charge of felony murder, which is also usually eligible
for the death penalty.424 The goal of the Model Code, which was endorsed
by the Committee, was to return these crimes to their original purpose of
protecting people from danger. Protecting property, while an important
goal of the criminal justice system, should nevertheless be secondary and
dealt with separately.

424. See Johnson, supra note 1, at V.B. 1. c. ii-iii.
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Appendix A
Mississippi arson and related statutes that would be repealed.
§ 97-17-1. Arson; first degree; burning dwelling house or outbuilding.
(1) Any person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns
or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning
of any dwelling house, whether occupied, unoccupied or vacant, or
any kitchen, shop, barn, stable or other outhouse that is parcel
thereof, or belonging to or adjoining thereto, or any state-supported
school building in this state whether the property of himself or of
another, shall be guilty of arson in the first degree, and upon
conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than
five (5) nor more than twenty (20) years and shall pay restitution for
any damage caused.
(2) Any person convicted under this section shall be subject to treble
damages for any damage caused by such person.
(3) Any property used in the commission of the offense of arson in
the first degree shall be subject to forfeiture as provided in Section
97-17-4.
§ 97-17-3. Arson; first degree; place of worship; failure to report accidental
fires; juvenile offenders.
(1) Any person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to, or burns,
or causes to be burned, or who is a party to destruction by explosion
from combustible material, who aids, counsels, or procures the
burning or destruction of any church, temple, synagogue or other
established place of worship, whether in use or vacant, shall be
guilty of arson in the first degree and, upon conviction therefor,
shall be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than five (5) nor
more than thirty (30) years and shall pay restitution for any damage
caused.
(2) Any person observing or witnessing the destruction by fire of
any state-supported school building or any church, temple,
synagogue or other established place of worship, whether occupied
or vacant, which fire was the result of his or her act of an accidental
nature, and who willfully fails to sound the general alarm or report
such fire to the local fire department or other local authorities, shall
be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction therefor, shall be
sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than two (2) nor more than
ten (10) years and shall pay restitution for any damage caused.
(3) Any person, who by reason of his age comes under the
jurisdiction of juvenile authorities and who is found guilty under
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subsection (1) of this section, shall not be eligible for probation
unless and until at least six (6) months’ confinement has been served
in a state reform school.
(4) Any person convicted under this section shall be subject to treble
damages for any damage caused by such person.
(5) Any property used in the commission of arson in the first degree
shall be subject to forfeiture as provided in Section 97-17-4.
§ 97-17-5. Arson; second degree; other buildings or structures.
Any person who wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or
causes to be burned, or who aids, counsels or procures the burning
of any building or structure of whatsoever class or character,
whether the property of himself or of another, not included or
described in Section 97-17-1 or Section 97-17-3, shall be guilty of
arson in the second degree, and upon conviction thereof, be
sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than ten
years.
§ 97-17-7. Arson; third degree; personal property.
Any person who wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or
causes to be burned, or who aids, counsels or procures the burning
of any personal property of whatsoever class or character; (such
property being of the value of twenty-five dollars and the property
of another person), shall be guilty of arson in the third degree and
upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less
than one nor more than three years.
§ 97-17-9. Arson; fourth degree; attempt to burn.
(1) Any person who wilfully and maliciously attempts to set fire to
or attempts to burn or to aid, counsel or procure the burning of any
of the buildings or property mentioned in the foregoing sections, or
who commits any act preliminary thereto, or in furtherance thereof,
shall be guilty of arson in the fourth degree and upon conviction
thereof be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than one nor
more than two years or fined not to exceed one thousand dollars.
(2) The placing or distributing of any flammable, explosive or
combustible material or substance, or any device in any building or
property mentioned in the foregoing sections in an arrangement or
preparation with intent to eventually, wilfully and maliciously set
fire to or burn same, or to procure the setting fire to or burning of
same shall, for the purposes of this section constitute an attempt to
burn such building or property.
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§ 97-17-11. Arson; insured property.
Any person who wilfully and with intent to injure or defraud the
insurer sets fire to or burns or attempts so to do or who causes to be
burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any
building, structure or personal property, of whatsoever class or
character, whether the property of himself or of another, which shall
at the time be insured by any person, company or corporation
against loss or damage by fire, shall be guilty of a felony and upon
conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than
one (1) nor more than ten (10) years.
§ 97-17-13. Arson; willfully or negligently firing woods, marsh, meadow,
etc.; restitution of fire suppression costs.
(1) If any person willfully, maliciously, and feloniously sets on fire
any woods, meadow, marsh, field or prairie, not his own, he is guilty
of a felony and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to the State
Penitentiary for not more than two (2) years nor less than one (1)
year, or fined not less than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) nor
more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or both, in the
discretion of the court.
(2)
(a) If any person recklessly or with gross negligence causes
fire to burn any woods, meadow, marsh, field or prairie, not
his own, he is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, on
conviction, be fined not less than One Hundred Dollars
($100.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or
imprisoned in the county jail not more than three (3) months,
or both, in the discretion of the court.
(b) If a person has a brush or debris pile or other material
which is or was being burned and reasonable and prudent
efforts were not taken to prevent the spread of the fire onto
the lands of another shall be evidence that such person
recklessly or with gross negligence caused the land to burn.
(3) In addition to the penalties provided in this section, upon
conviction, a person shall be ordered to reimburse and pay in
restitution directly to any organized fire suppression agency
recognized by the Mississippi Forestry Commission all the costs the
agency incurred related to the suppression and abatement of the fire.
§ 97-17-4. Forfeiture of property used in commission of arson.
(1) All property, real or personal, including money, used in the
course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized
through, conduct in violation of a provision of Section 97-17-
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1 or 97-17-3 is subject to civil forfeiture to the state pursuant to the
provisions of this section; provided, however, that a forfeiture of
personal property encumbered by a bona fide security interest or
real property encumbered by a bona fide mortgage, deed of trust,
lien or encumbrance of record shall be subject to the interest of the
secured party or subject to the interest of the holder of the mortgage
deed of trust, lien of encumbrance of record if such secured party or
holder neither had knowledge of or consented to the act or omission.
(2) Property subject to forfeiture may be seized by law enforcement
officers upon process issued by any appropriate court having
jurisdiction over the property. Seizure without process may be made
if:
(a) The seizure is incident to an arrest or a search under a
search warrant or an inspection under a lawful
administrative inspection;
(b) The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a
prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction
or forfeiture proceeding based upon this section.
(3) When any property is seized pursuant to this section,
proceedings under this section shall be instituted promptly.
(4)
(a) A petition for forfeiture shall be filed promptly in the
name of the State of Mississippi with the clerk of the circuit
court of the county in which the seizure is made. A copy of
such petition shall be served upon the following persons by
service of process in the same manner as in civil cases:
(i) The owner of the property, if address is known;
(ii) Any secured party who has registered his lien or
filed a financing statement as provided by law, if the
identity of such secured party can be ascertained by
the state by making a good faith effort to ascertain
the identity of such secured party as described in
paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of this subsection;
(iii) Any other bona fide lienholder or secured party
or other person holding an interest in the property in
the nature of a security interest of whom the state has
actual knowledge;
(iv) A holder of a mortgage, deed of trust, lien or
encumbrance of record, if the property is real estate
by making a good faith inquiry as described in
paragraph (g) of this section; and
(v) Any person in possession of property subject to
forfeiture at the time that it was seized.
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(b) If the property is a motor vehicle susceptible of titling
under the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Title Law and if there
is any reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle has been
titled, the state shall make inquiry of the State Tax
Commission as to what the records of the State Tax
Commission show as to who is the record owner of the
vehicle and who, if anyone, holds any lien or security
interest which affects the vehicle.
(c) If the property is a motor vehicle and is not titled in the
State of Mississippi, then the state shall attempt to ascertain
the name and address of the person in whose name the
vehicle is licensed, and if the vehicle is licensed in a state
which has in effect a certificate of title law, the state shall
make inquiry of the appropriate agency of that state as to
what the records of the agency show as to who is the record
owner of the vehicle and who, if anyone, holds any lien,
security interest, or other instrument in the nature of a
security device which affects the vehicle.
(d) If the property is of a nature that a financing statement is
required by the laws of this state to be filed to perfect a
security interest affecting the property and if there is any
reasonable cause to believe that a financing statement
covering the security interest has been filed under the laws
of this state, the state shall make inquiry of the appropriate
office designated in Section 75-9-501 as to what the records
show as to who is the record owner of the property and who,
if anyone, has filed a financing statement affecting the
property.
(e) If the property is an aircraft or part thereof and if there is
any reasonable cause to believe that an instrument in the
nature of a security device affects the property, then the state
shall make inquiry of the administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration as to what the records of the
administrator show as to who is the record owner of the
property and who, if anyone, holds an instrument in the
nature of a security device which affects the property.
(f) In the case of all other personal property subject to
forfeiture, if there is any reasonable cause to believe that an
instrument in the nature of a security device affects the
property, then the state shall make a good faith inquiry to
identify the holder of any such instrument.
(g) If the property is real estate, the state shall make inquiry
at the appropriate places to determine who is the owner of
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record and who, if anyone is a holder of a bona fide
mortgage, deed of trust, lien or encumbrance.
(h) In the event the answer to an inquiry states that the record
owner of the property is any person other than the person
who was in possession of it when it was seized, or states that
any person holds any lien, encumbrance, security interest,
other interest in the nature of a security interest, mortgage or
deed of trust which affects the property, the state shall cause
any record owner and also any lienholder, secured party,
other person who holds an interest in the property in the
nature of a security interest, or holder of an encumbrance,
mortgage or deed of trust which affects the property to be
named in the petition of forfeiture and to be served with
process in the same manner as in civil cases.
(i) If the owner of the property cannot be found and served
with a copy of the petition of forfeiture, or if no person was
in possession of the property subject to forfeiture at the time
that it was seized and the owner of the property is unknown,
the state shall file with the clerk of the court in which the
proceeding is pending an affidavit to such effect, whereupon
the clerk of the court shall publish notice of the hearing
addressed to “the Unknown Owner of ,” filling in the blank
space with a reasonably detailed description of the property
subject to forfeiture. Service by publication shall contain the
other requisites prescribed in Section 11-33-41, and shall be
served as provided in Section 11-33-37 for publication of
notice for attachments at law.
(j) No proceedings instituted pursuant to the provisions of
this article shall proceed to hearing unless the judge
conducting the hearing is satisfied that this section has been
complied with. Any answer received from an inquiry
required by paragraphs (b) through (g) of this section shall
be introduced into evidence at the hearing.
(5)
(a) An owner of property that has been seized shall file a
verified answer within twenty (20) days after the completion
of service of process. If no answer is filed, the court shall
hear evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture and
forfeit the property to the state. If an answer is filed, a time
for hearing on forfeiture shall be set within thirty (30) days
of filing the answer or at the succeeding term of court if
court would not be in progress within thirty (30) days after
filing the answer. Provided, however, that upon request by
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the state or the owner of the property, the court may
postpone said forfeiture hearing to a date past the time any
criminal action is pending against said owner.
(b) If the owner of the property has filed a verified answer
denying that the property is subject to forfeiture, then the
burden is on the state to prove that the property is subject to
forfeiture. The burden of proof placed upon the state shall
be clear and convincing proof. However, if no answer has
been filed by the owner of the property, the petition for
forfeiture may be introduced into evidence and is prima
facie evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture.
(c) At the hearing any claimant of any right, title, or interest
in the property may prove his lien, encumbrance, security
interest, other interest in the nature of a security interest,
mortgage or deed of trust to be bona fide and created without
knowledge or consent that the property was to be used so as
to cause the property to be subject to forfeiture.
(d) If it is found that the property is subject to forfeiture, then
the judge shall forfeit the property to the state. However, if
proof at the hearing discloses that the interest of any bona
fide lienholder, secured party, other person holding an
interest in the property in the nature of a security interest or
any holder of a bona fide encumbrance, mortgage or deed of
trust is greater than or equal to the present value of the
property, the court shall order the property released to him.
If such interest is less than the present value of the property
and if the proof shows that the property is subject to
forfeiture, the court shall order the property forfeited to the
state.
(6)
(a) All personal property, including money, which is
forfeited to the state and is not capable of being sold at
public auction shall be liquidated and the proceeds, after
deduction of all storage and court costs, shall be forwarded
to the State Treasurer and deposited in the General Fund of
the state.
(b) All real estate which is forfeited to the state shall be sold
to the highest bidder at a public auction to be conducted by
the state at such place, on such notice and in accordance with
the same procedure, as far as practicable, as is required in
the case of sales of land under execution of law. The
proceeds of such sale shall first be applied to the cost and
expense in administering and conducting such sale, then to
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the satisfaction of all mortgages, deeds of trusts, liens and
encumbrances of record on such property. All proceeds in
excess of the amount necessary for the cost of the sale of
such land and the satisfaction of any liens thereon shall be
deposited in the General Fund of the State Treasury.
(c) All other property that has been seized by the state and
that has been forfeited shall, except as otherwise provided,
be sold at a public auction for cash by the state to the highest
and best bidder after advertising the sale for at least once
each week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the last notice to
appear not more than ten (10) days nor less than five (5) days
prior to such sale, in a newspaper having a general
circulation throughout the State of Mississippi. Such notices
shall contain a description of the property to be sold and a
statement of the time and place of sale. It shall not be
necessary to the validity of such sale either to have the
property present at the place of sale or to have the name of
the owner thereof stated in such notice. The proceeds of the
sale shall be delivered to the circuit clerk and shall be
disposed of as follows:
(i) To any bona fide lienholder, secured party, or
other party holding an interest in the property in the
nature of a security interest, to the extent of his
interest; and
(ii) The balance, if any, after deduction of all storage
and court costs, shall be forwarded to the State
Treasurer and deposited with and used as general
funds of the state.
(ii) The balance, if any, after deduction of all storage
and court costs, shall be forwarded to the State
Treasurer and deposited with and used as general
funds of the state.
(d) The State Tax Commission shall issue a certificate of
title to any person who purchases property under the
provisions of this section when a certificate of title is
required under the laws of this state.
§ 97-17-14. Aggravated assault upon fire fighter, law enforcement officer
or emergency medical personnel by injury-causing arson.
Any person or persons who willfully, feloniously and maliciously
set fire to or burn or cause to be burned or who aid, counsel or
procure the burning of any commercial or residential building,
whether occupied, unoccupied or vacant or any kitchen, shop, barn,
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stable, outhouse, vehicle, or wood, meadow, marsh, field or prairie,
whether the property of the person or persons setting the fire or of
another, and thereby cause serious bodily injury to a firefighter, law
enforcement officer or any emergency medical personnel while said
firefighter, law enforcement officer or emergency personnel is
acting within the scope of his duty and office, whether said injury
shall be intentional or unintentional, shall be guilty of aggravated
assault and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of
not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or by
imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years in the Penitentiary or
by both such fine and imprisonment.
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Appendix B
Mississippi Robbery and related statutes that would be repealed.
§ 97-3-73. Robbery; definition.
Every person who shall feloniously take the personal property of
another, in his presence or from his person and against his will, by
violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of some
immediate injury to his person, shall be guilty of robbery.
§ 97-3-75. Robbery; penalty.
Every person convicted of robbery shall be punished by
imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not more than fifteen
years.
§ 97-3-77. Robbery; threat to injure person or relative at another time.
Every person who shall feloniously take the personal property of
another, in his presence or from his person, which shall have been
delivered or suffered to be taken through fear of some injury
threatened to be inflicted at some different time to his person or
property, or to the person of any member of his family or relative,
which fear shall have been produced by the threats of the person so
receiving or taking such property, shall be guilty of robbery.
§ 97-3-79. Robbery; use of deadly weapon.
Every person who shall feloniously take or attempt to take from the
person or from the presence the personal property of another and
against his will by violence to his person or by putting such person
in fear of immediate injury to his person by the exhibition of a
deadly weapon shall be guilty of robbery and, upon conviction, shall
be imprisoned for life in the state penitentiary if the penalty is so
fixed by the jury; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty
at imprisonment for life in the state penitentiary the court shall fix
the penalty at imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any term
not less than three (3) years.
§ 97-3-81. Robbery; threatening letter demanding money, property.
Every person who shall knowingly send or deliver, or shall make,
and, for the purpose of being sent or delivered, shall part with the
possession of any letter or writing with or without a name
subscribed thereto, or signed with a fictitious name, or with any
letter, mark, or other designation, threatening therein to accuse any
person of a crime or to do any injury to the person or property of
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any one, with a view or intent to extort or gain money or property
of any description belonging to another, shall be guilty of an attempt
to rob, and shall, on conviction be punished by imprisonment in the
penitentiary not exceeding five years.
§ 97-3-115. Mississippi Carjacking Act; definitions.
The following words and phrases shall have the meanings ascribed herein
unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:
(a) “Carjacking” means taking of a motor vehicle from another
person’s immediate actual possession knowingly or recklessly by
force or violence, whether against resistance or by sudden or
stealthy seizure or snatching, or by putting in fear, or attempting to
do so, or by any other means.
(b) “Motor vehicle” includes every device in, upon or by which any
person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a
highway, which is self-propelled.
§ 97-3-117. Mississippi Carjacking Act; what constitutes offense of
carjacking; attempted carjacking; armed carjacking; penalties.
(1) Whoever shall knowingly or recklessly by force or violence,
whether against resistance or by sudden or stealthy seizure or
snatching, or by putting in fear, or attempting to do so, or by any
other means shall take a motor vehicle from another person’s
immediate actual possession shall be guilty of carjacking.
(a) A person who is convicted of carjacking shall be fined
not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) and be
committed to the custody of the State Department of
Corrections for not more than fifteen (15) years.
(b) A person who is convicted of attempted carjacking shall
receive the same punishment as the person who is convicted
of carjacking.
(2) Whoever commits the offense of carjacking while armed with or
having readily available any pistol or other firearm or imitation
thereof or other dangerous or deadly weapon, including a sawed-off
shotgun, shotgun, machine gun, rifle, dirk, bowie knife, butcher
knife, switchblade, razor, blackjack, billy, or metallic or other false
knuckles, or any object capable of inflicting death or serious bodily
harm, shall be guilty of armed carjacking.
(a) Any person who is convicted of armed carjacking shall
be fined not more than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00)
and be committed to the custody of the State Department of
Corrections for not more than thirty (30) years.
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(b) Any person who is convicted of attempted armed
carjacking shall receive the same punishment as the person
who is convicted of armed carjacking.
(3) Any person convicted of a second or subsequent offense under
this section shall be fined an amount up to twice that otherwise
authorized and shall be imprisoned for a term up to twice the term
otherwise authorized.
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Appendix C
Mississippi burglary and related statutes that would be repealed.
§ 97-17-23. Burglary; breaking and entering inhabited dwelling; home
invasion.
(1) Every person who shall be convicted of breaking and entering
the dwelling house or inner door of such dwelling house of another,
whether armed with a deadly weapon or not, and whether there shall
be at the time some human being in such dwelling house or not, with
intent to commit some crime therein, shall be punished by
commitment to the custody of the Department of Corrections for not
less than three (3) years nor more than twenty-five (25) years.
(2) Every person who shall be convicted of violating subsection (1)
under circumstances likely to terrorize any person who is actually
occupying the house at the time of the criminal invasion of the
premises shall be punished by imprisonment in the custody of the
Department of Corrections for not less than ten (10) years nor more
than twenty-five (25) years.
§ 97-17-25. Burglary; breaking out of dwelling.
Every person who, being in the dwelling house of another, shall
commit a crime, and shall break any outer door, or any other part of
said house, to get out of the same, shall be guilty of burglary, and
be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten years
§ 97-17-29. Burglary; breaking inner door of dwelling by one lawfully in
house.
Every person who, being lawfully in the dwelling house of another,
shall break an inner door of the same house, with intent to commit
a crime, shall be guilty of burglary, and imprisoned in the
penitentiary not more than ten years.
§ 97-17-31. Burglary; dwelling house defined.
Every building joined to, immediately connected with, or being part
of the dwelling house, shall be deemed the dwelling house
§ 97-17-33. Burglary; breaking and entering building other than dwelling;
railroad car; vessels; automobiles.
(1) Every person who shall be convicted of breaking and entering,
in the day or night, any shop, store, booth, tent, warehouse, or other
building or private room or office therein, water vessel, commercial
or pleasure craft, ship, steamboat, flatboat, railroad car, automobile,
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truck or trailer in which any goods, merchandise, equipment or
valuable thing shall be kept for use, sale, deposit, or transportation,
with intent to steal therein, or to commit any felony, or who shall be
convicted of breaking and entering in the day or night time, any
building within the curtilage of a dwelling house, not joined to,
immediately connected with or forming a part thereof, shall be
guilty of burglary, and imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than
seven (7) years.
(2) Any person who shall be convicted of breaking and entering a
church, synagogue, temple or other established place of worship
with intent to commit some crime therein shall be punished by
imprisonment in the penitentiary not more than fourteen (14) years.
§ 97-17-37. Burglary; with explosives.
Any person, who, with intent to commit crime, breaks and enters,
either by day or by night, any building, whether inhabited or not,
and opens or attempts to open any vault, safe or other secure place
by the use of nitroglycerine, dynamite, gunpowder or any other
explosive, shall be deemed guilty of burglary with explosives.
Any person duly convicted of burglary with explosives shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a term of not
less than five (5) years nor more than forty (40) years.
§ 97-17-85. Trespass; going upon enclosed land of another.
Except as otherwise provided in Section 73-13-103, if any person
shall go upon the enclosed land of another without his consent, after
having been notified by such person or his agent not to do so, either
personally or by published or posted notice, or shall remain on such
land after a request by such person or his agent to depart, he shall,
upon conviction, be fined not more than Fifty Dollars ($ 50.00) for
such offense. The provisions of this section shall apply to land not
enclosed where the stock law is in force.
§ 97-17-89. Trespass; destruction or carrying away of vegetation, etc. not
amounting to larceny.
Any person who shall enter upon the closed or unenclosed lands of
another or of the public and who shall willfully and wantonly gather
and unlawfully sever, destroy, carry away or injure any trees,
shrubs, flowers, moss, grain, turf, grass, hay, fruits, nuts or
vegetables thereon, where such action shall not amount to larceny,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined
not exceeding five hundred dollars ($ 500.00), or be imprisoned not
exceeding six (6) months in the county jail, or both; and a verdict of
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guilty of such action may be rendered under an indictment for
larceny, if the evidence shall not warrant a verdict of guilty of
larceny, but shall warrant a conviction under this section.
§ 97-17-93. Entering lands of another without permission; enforcement;
relation to other statutes; dismissal of prosecution.
(1) Any person who knowingly enters the lands of another without
the permission of or without being accompanied by the landowner
or the lessee of the land, or the agent of such landowner or lessee,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be
punished for the first offense by a fine of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars
($ 250.00). Upon conviction of any person for a second or
subsequent offense, the offenses being committed within five (5)
years of the last offense, such person shall be punished by a fine of
Five Hundred Dollars ($ 500.00), and may be imprisoned in the
county jail for a period of not less than ten (10) nor more than thirty
(30) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. This section shall
not apply to the landowner's or lessee's family, guests, or agents, to
a surveyor as provided in Section 73-13-103, or to persons entering
upon such lands for lawful business purposes.
(2)
(a) It shall be the duty of sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, constables
and conservation officers to enforce this section.
(b) Such officers shall enforce this section by issuing a
citation to those charged with trespassing under this section.
(3) The provisions of this section are supplementary to the
provisions of any other statute of this state.
(4) A prosecution under the provisions of this section shall be
dismissed upon the request of the landowner, lessee of the land or
agent of such landowner or lessee, as the case may be.
§ 97-17-95. Trespass; entry on premises where atomic machinery, rockets
and other dangerous devices are manufactured, etc.
It shall be unlawful for any person to wilfully enter or trespass
within the premises of any person, firm or corporation
manufacturing or constructing or erecting or assembling or
maintaining or repairing or operating any nuclear powered
machinery, equipment or vessels, or rockets, missiles, propulsion
systems, explosives or other dangerous devices, or parts thereof,
with the intent to commit any crime under the laws of this state, or
of the United States, or pursuant to a conspiracy to commit any such
crime or in an attempt to commit any such crime. Any person
convicted of a violation of this section shall be adjudged guilty of a
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felony, and punished by a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars
($ 5,000.00) or by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not to
exceed five (5) years, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court. Any person wilfully entering or trespassing
within such premises, if found within any area designated as a
restricted area therein, shall be guilty of a violation of this section.]
§ 97-17-97. Trespass; going into or upon, or remaining in or upon,
buildings, premises or lands of another after being forbidden to do so.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 73-13-103, if any
person or persons shall without authority of law go into or upon or
remain in or upon any building, premises or land of another,
including the premises of any public housing authority after having
been banned from returning to the premises of the housing
authority, whether an individual, a corporation, partnership, or
association, or any part, portion or area thereof, after having been
forbidden to do so, either orally or in writing including any sign
hereinafter mentioned, by any owner, or lessee, or custodian, or
other authorized person, or by the administrators of a public housing
authority regardless of whether or not having been invited onto the
premises of the housing authority by a tenant, or after having been
forbidden to do so by such sign or signs posted on, or in such
building, premises or land, or part, or portion, or area thereof, at a
place or places where such sign or signs may be reasonably seen,
such person or persons shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon
conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five
Hundred Dollars ($ 500.00) or by confinement in the county jail not
exceeding six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(2) The provisions of this section are supplementary to the
provisions of any other statute of this state.
§ 97-17-99. Trespass; inciting or soliciting etc., persons to go into or upon,
or remain in or upon, buildings, premises or lands of another.
(1) If any person or persons shall incite, or solicit, or urge, or
encourage, or exhort, or instigate, or procure any other person or
persons to go into or upon or to remain in or upon any building, or
premises, or land of another whether an individual, a corporation,
partnership, or association, or any part, portion or area thereof,
knowing such other person or persons to have been forbidden, either
orally or in writing including any sign hereinafter mentioned, to do
so by any owner, or lessee, or custodian, or other authorized person,
or knowing such other person or persons to have been forbidden to
do so by a sign or signs posted in or upon such building, or premises,
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or land, or part, or portion thereof, at a place or places where it or
they may be reasonably seen, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than
five hundred dollars ($ 500.00) or by confinement in the county jail
not exceeding six (6) months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
(2) The provisions of this section are supplementary to the
provisions of any other statute of this state.
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